Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation in the 1950s-1970s by Konnoth, Craig J
TH AL LAW JO RAL
CRAIG J. KONNOTH
Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity,
and Gay Litigation in the 195os-1970s
A B ST RACT. Existing accounts of early gay rights litigation largely focus on how the
suppression and liberation of gay identity affected early activism. This Note helps complicate
these dynamics, arguing that gay identity was not just suppressed and then liberated, but
substantially transformed by activist efforts during this period, and that this transformation
fundamentally affected the nature of gay activism. Gay organizers in the 195os and 196os moved
from avoiding identity-based claims to analogizing gays to African-Americans. By transforming
themselves in the image of a successful black civil rights minority, activists attempted to win over
skeptical courts in a period when equal protection doctrine was still quite fluid. Furthermore,
through this attempted identity transformation, activists replaced stigmatizing medico-religious
models of homosexuality with self-affirming civil rights-based models. This identity
transformation through analogy cemented gay rank-and-file perception of the social treatment
they faced as unjust, and helped determine what remedies gays would seek. For example,
defensive gay litigation of the 195os soon gave way to the affirmative impact-type litigation of
the civil rights movement. Similarly, in the image of the 196os racial justice movement, 1970s
gays began to pursue legal acceptance of gay marriage rather than first seeking intermediate
relationship recognition. Thus, analogies and identity claims can be useful tools for perceiving
and remedying oppression. They should, however, be tools that unite, not divide groups: gays
and blacks, especially, should recognize their (contingent) commonalities, created as gays
remade themselves in the image of blacks.
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INTRODUCTION
In today's battle over gay rights, combatants draw upon powerful social
and cultural discourses to frame gays in diametrically opposite ways.
Opponents of gay rights use traditional religious understandings of sexuality
and gender roles. Supporters, in turn, utilize language of civil rights that
constructs gays as a legal minority group, both to gain judicial solicitude and to
sway broader audiences.
This Note suggests that the construction of gay identity, to a large extent,
determines the extent of rights that individuals attracted to the same sex enjoy.
Theorists have noted, put simply, that a major function of individual identity is
to establish the relationship between the individual and society. An individual's
self-perception helps determine where she thinks she fits within society, and
the role she plays in it; the way society perceives the identity determines which
roles will be granted her, and which denied.' That gays are now able to use
legal minority group identity to mediate their relationship with society, rather
than rely on medicine or religion (which construct gay identity in very different
ways), has completely resituated gays within society, both to themselves and,
increasingly, to the general public. It has affected which rights gays have
sought and the ways in which they have sought these rights.
While the use of law to suppress identity generally has been explored, the
relationship between the substantive development of, and alteration in,
elements of minority identity (whether suppressed or not) and litigation
strategies bears further discussion Gay rights history readily lends itself to
1. The literature that makes this point is varied. A classic statement is ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 123-25 (Touchstone 1986)
(1963). For a full, recent review of the history of "identity theory, [which] explains the
relationship between society and individuals," see Michael L. Hecht et al., The
Communication Theory of Identity: Development, Theoretical Perspective, and Future Directions,
in THEORIZING ABOUT INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 257, 260 (William B. Gudykunst
ed., 2005).
2. The relationship between identity and litigation has thus far focused on the use of law to
suppress and liberate identity. Professor William Eskridge, the foremost legal historian on
gay rights, has covered legal and doctrinal developments in gay rights litigation across its
history, see, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the
Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and
Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 817 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge, Challenging],
and has developed a theory on the doctrinal trajectory that minority movements take, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 15o U.
PA. L. REV. 419 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 1OO
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this analysis, given a rich theoretical literature on the subject of sexuality and
identity. This Note specifically addresses the analogy between race and
sexuality made by midcentury gay rights activists, which played a major role in
altering gay identity (perceived from within and without the community) and
thus gay litigation methods. While the Note focuses on the race analogy, other
legal developments have, of course, also played roles in developing the way we
think of today's gay community.
As Part II of the Note indicates, the debate over the race analogy has raged
since the beginning of the gay rights movement. As gay urban enclaves grew in
the post-World War II era, greater visibility led to greater societal suppression,
which in turn led to greater gay mobilization.3 Using the analogy, a few early
gay organizers argued that gays, like African-Americans, are a minority, that
discrimination against them should bear the same stigma as racial
discrimination, and that judges should be as attentive to gay rights as they are
to racial justice. However, the mid-century "homophiles" who ran the first
modern gay rights organizations initially challenged the analogy between race
and sexuality.4 At the same time, these leaders needed new ways to articulate
the relationship between homosexuals and society as a whole in order to aid
mobilization efforts. Thus, in their litigation, they resisted allusions to
homosexual "identity" and attempted to disrupt group status altogether. Using
new scientific models, they argued that homosexuality consisted simply of
certain acts, urges, and experiences that were common to all human beings,
rather than to one identifiable group of individuals.
Courts and politicians, however, continued to rely on traditional psychiatry
and religion to identify gays as a group and emphasized the perverse,
MIcH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Some Effects]. However, his extensive
corpus speaks primarily to the closetedness and suppression of minority groups, and their
response to those conditions. While Eskridge observes that the comparison to the civil
rights movement helped engender an identity for gay individuals, the point is related to a
doctrinal focus on equal protection arguments. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra, at 97; Eskridge,
Some Effects, supra, at 2169. Similarly, Professor Kenji Yoshino has explained that his focus
in analyzing 195os and 196OS gay rights litigation has been upon "the demands of coerced
assimilation," rather than the interplay of identity categories and litigation strategies. KENJI
YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CiviL RIGHTS 93 (2007); see also Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, ill YALE L.J. 769 (2002) [hereinafter Yoshino, Covering]. On the other
hand, this Note does not deal with identity-suppression or liberation per se. Rather, it
discusses how substantive alterations in identity models (uncloseted or closeted) are
produced through litigation; these alterations in how individuals see themselves and how
they are seen by society in turn provide impetus for further litigation.
3. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 2, at 57-59.
4. Homophile is the term that many homosexuals in the 1950s and 196os used to refer to
themselves.
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homosexual identity of these organizations. Gays themselves internalized many
of these claims. Unable-and often unwilling-to dissolve the separate
homosexual group identity bestowed upon them, activists responded to the
majority's construction by creating their own, kinder version of a gay identity,
analogizing themselves to African-Americans. s This analogy provided a way for
gays to articulate an identity which explained how they fit into society and
their belief that, while differences existed between homosexuals and
heterosexuals, they were not significant. The similarity of the contexts of
oppression that blacks and gays faced ensured that the analogy resonated for
much of the homosexual, and some of the heterosexual, audiences. Slowly, the
identity model that grew from the analogy, combined with other sociocultural
events, took root and transformed the way gays saw themselves, from medical
patients and outcasts into a legal minority in search of civil rights. In the
process, Part III concludes, gay identity began to stabilize on its own terms.
While the race analogy continued to be used to transform public perceptions,
gays were no longer required to invoke racial identity to describe themselves as
a legal minority-they began to be understood as such in their own right.
Even as the race-sexuality analogy diminished in importance in the early
1970s, historical developments during the same period solidified dependence
on a race-sex analogy in litigation, as Part IV describes. The racial justice
movement initially provided no purchase for the family rights concerns of gays.
Its focus remained on the right of whites and blacks to intermarry. Gays, in
turn, rejected marriage as a desirable relationship form in the 195os. However,
at the end of the following decade, as the women's rights movement gained
momentum, its advocates began analogizing the position of women to that of
racial minorities for the first time. This led to a sudden change in the approach
to relationship rights in the gay movement. Gays, who less than two decades
earlier scorned the idea of gay marriage, now drew both from the racial justice
movement's focus on intermarriage and the women's movement's use of the
race-sex analogy to argue that prohibiting individuals from marrying based on
their sex was as impermissible as similar prohibitions based on race.6 The race-
sex analogy allowed, and perhaps encouraged, gays to leapfrog demands for
incremental same-sex relationship benefits (such as domestic partnership
rights) and focus on the issue of marriage. Finally, the Part concludes by
s. William Eskridge describes these methods of activists as moving from a "politics of
protection," concealing their identity, to "a politics of recognition," adopting their identity.
Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 2, at 2161-79.
6. It is unclear whether gays in the early 1970s had already changed their minds on the issue of
marriage, whether they focused on marriage because it was the only relationship form that
fit neatly into the race-sex analogy, or some combination of the two.
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explaining why activists continue to rely on the race-sex analogy in litigation,
even as the race-sexuality analogy has diminished in importance, and describes
how courts challenge the race-sex analogy.
The insights gained from this historical discussion of the origins and
development of the analogy also help address criticism that the analogy has
more recently attracted along at least two significant lines. The first line of
criticism identifies certain characteristics of gays that purportedly differentiate
them from African-Americans. According to this argument, for example, unlike
blacks, gays choose and are able to conceal their minority status (that is, their
sexuality) and are politically powerful.7 Events in November of last year
brought this critique into the mainstream, when a majority of African-
American Californians voted to amend the state constitution to ban gay
marriage.8 The day after the election, a gay Huffington Post blogger castigated
these African-American voters, suggesting that gays were a minority group
analogous to blacks, in a post entitled African-Americans vs Gay Americans?9
7. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, A Better Analogy: "Jews," "Homosexuals," and the Inclusion of Sexual
Orientation as a Forbidden Characteristic in Antidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
37, 37-39 (2001) (cataloguing criticisms of the race-sexuality analogy that argue that unlike
gay Americans, blacks do not choose their minority status, that discrimination has less
severe economic and social consequences for gays, and "that although race is usually
revealed by appearance, people can choose not to reveal their sexual orientation, and thus
les/bi/gay people can avoid discrimination in a way that most African-Americans cannot,"
and suggesting that other, religion-based, analogies should be used to gain gay rights). But
see EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE'S
RIGHT To MARRY 164-68 (2004) (describing and criticizing arguments against the race-
sexuality analogy); Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Discourse: Learning from the Civil
Rights Movement in the Quest for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 679,
681-83 (1996) (noting criticisms of the race-sexuality analogy, but arguing that the African-
American civil rights movement has lessons for the gay rights movement); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REv. 873, 875-76 (2006) (arguing that
concealment of sexuality is as great a burden as the displaying of race). Those discussions
that do specifically focus on historical analogies ignore the historical development of the
race-sexuality analogy. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS:
RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES 39-83 (1999).
8. See Susan Ferriss & Phillip Reese, Black Voters Helped Prop. 8 Passage, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 7, 2008, at 1A ("'The Obama people were thrilled to turn out high percentages of
African Americans, but (Proposition 8) literally wouldn't have passed without those voters
.... ' (quoting Gary Dietrich, President of Citizen Voice)).
9. Judy Wieder, African Americans vs Gay Americans?, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2008,
http ://www.huffingtonpost.con/judy-wieder/african-americans-vs-gay-b_1416o6.html; see
also Wayne Besen, Frank Talk on Race and Prop. 8, 365GAY, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://www.365gay.com/opinion/besen-frank-talk-on-race-and-prop-8 ("[T]here is
something particularly galling and repugnant about people who have felt the sting of
discrimination, [who then] turn around and step on another minority."); Dan Savage, Black
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The nation's leading LGBT news magazine, The Advocate, echoed this
argument the next month. Upon its cover in big white letters against a black
background was the slogan: "Gay Is the New Black: The Last Great Civil
Rights Struggle."1 Opponents of this view, including many from the African-
American gay community, challenged the analogy, pointing to the generally
privileged socio-economic status of gays and the lack of interaction between
African-American communities and gay civil rights leaders; these
commentators defended the African-American vote."
This Note, however, demonstrates that gays as a group constructed an
important component of their identity through interaction with and lessons
from the African-American community. The racial justice movement and the
harms and inequalities it targeted colored what gays saw as harmful to them
and the appropriate methods and strategies to remedy these harms. Thus,
while many differences between gays and African-Americans do exist socially
and otherwise, the rights both groups seek are similar precisely because gay
activists targeted many rights that the civil rights movement vindicated. This
interlinked past may help both critics and supporters of the race analogy to
understand the interplay between the movements -supporters should
understand that the similarities between groups were in some cases carefully
constructed by activists, while critics may find that the groups are more alike
than they recognize precisely because of these constructed similarities. 2
Ultimately, gay rights as we understand them today would make very little
sense without a fundamental reliance on concepts and arguments formed
through reliance on the racial justice movement.
The second critique links the race analogy discussion to the act-versus-
identity debate, which has been a central feature of sexuality studies at least
Homophobia, Slog, Nov. 5, 2008, http://slog.thestranger.com/2oo8/i/black-homophobia
(accusing African-American voters of "writing anti-gay discrimination into California's
constitution").
io. THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 16, 2008. This issue led to a furor, especially in the blogosphere. See,
e.g., Michael Crawford, Is Gay the New Black?, The Bilerico Project, Dec. 9, 2008,
http://www.bilerico.con/2oo8/12/isgay-the-new-black.php; Melissa McEwan, A Perfect
Example, Unfortunately, Shakesville, Dec. 5, 2008, http://shakespearessister.blogspot.con/
2oo8/12/perfect-example-unfortunately.html; Jennifer Molina, Is Gay the New Black?
(Newsweek Dec. 7, 20o8), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch.V=3yk7ifzueSE.
ii. See, e.g., Jasmyne A. Cannick, Op-Ed, The Gay/Black Divide, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at
A23; Molina, supra note lo (interviewing Michael Crawford). Cannick is an African-
American lesbian; Crawford is an African-American gay man.
12. Serena Mayeri makes this point regarding analogical arguments: "The meanings and
consequences of analogical argumentation are closely tied to the historical context in which
the analogies are invoked ...." Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of Discrimination":
Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 11o YALE L.J. 1045, 1052 (2001).
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since Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality. 3 For queer theorists, sexual acts
should not inform or create sexual identity categories for the actor (for example,
presuming, or creating, a "gay" identity for an individual who engages in
same-sex sexual acts). Harvard law professor Janet Halley therefore attacks the
race analogy for hardening legal identity categories.' 4 Furthermore, as racial
identity is itself constructed,'" this analogy allows activists to bring already
unstable and problematic identity categories from racial justice litigation into
sexual rights litigation. This forces individuals to perform and act according to
these identities, ultimately limiting their range of sexual freedom.
The historical narrative set out in this Note shows that the gay legal
"identity" that queer activists criticize was indeed historically "constructed" and
therefore contingent. Yet, as the dynamics I explore demonstrate, this
construction was a necessary - and somewhat successful - strategy for early gay
activists to both mobilize themselves and counter opponents.
This Note also suggests how another concern and criticism of queer
activists regarding the gay movement-the focus on marriage-is also
connected to the race analogy. By analogizing themselves to blacks, gays saw
their harms and forged remedies based on the goals and successes of the racial
justice movement. Thus, these remedies often reflected the extent to which the
original (African-American) identity had already been altered to conform to
mainstream (white) standards. Marriage, in particular, into which blacks had
only fully assimilated in the previous century, became an important aim for the
gay rights movement. 6 Thus, reliance on the claim that gay identity is like
13. See I MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978); infra
Subsection II.A.4.
14. See Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115 (David Kairys ed., 3 d ed. 1998). The
act-identity critique permeates queer theory and has been made by other post-
identity/identity-deconstructing authors in related contexts. See, e.g., Judith Butler,
Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13,
13-14 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) ("[I]dentity categories tend to be instruments of regulatory
regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the rallying
points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression. This is not to say that I will not
appear at political occasions under the sign of lesbian, but that I would like to have it
permanently unclear what precisely that sign signifies.").
is. Halley, supra note 14, at 140.
16. See Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 253 (1999) (arguing that "African Americans
did not enter civil society on their own terms and accompanied by their own values, but
rather did so on the non-negotiable terms set by the dominant culture" and therefore had to
subscribe to a white vision of "legal marriage"); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 7, at 884
("[T]he bind of choosing between the socially constructed concepts of 'The Good Black
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
black identity enabled and encouraged marriage-based relationship recognition
models and linked the act-identity debate itself with the debate over whether
gay marriage is an appropriate aim for the movement.
I do not ultimately seek to resolve any debates. Under the first line of
criticism, both sides will find support in this Note -that gays were made to
appear similar to African Americans means that as a result of these efforts,
today, there are similarities (which supports one side), but also that these
similarities are contingent and constructed (which supports the other).
Similarly, queer theorists may conclude that even with gays' strategic
dependence on the racial justice movement, the use of the race analogy should
be limited in the future. They may feel that the fact that gay marriage claims
were partially constructed by the race analogy makes limiting the use of the
analogy all the more important. Ultimately, though, the analogy undergirds
the successes of the gay movement, both in terms of the self- and public
perception of gays. Thus, before reaching any conclusions, we must consider
the historical context, dynamics, and consequences of the analogy.
I. A NOTE ON THEORY: GAY IDENTITY AND HISTORY
While various characteristics are attributed to gays as a group today, they
are commonly seen as a legal minority in search of civil rights, which has not
always been the case. This Note provides a historical account of elements in the
development of this aspect of gay identity. At the outset, it is important to
model what one means by gay identity and understand how its elements may
be historically created.
Homosexual identity is an umbrella concept that brings together many
elements and categories that are contingently and historically (as opposed to
Man' and 'The Bad Black Man' incentivizes middle-class heterosexual black men to perform
their identity in a way that further entrenches current race, sex, class, and sexuality-based
hierarchies. For example, these identity performances reinforce status positions that place
black men above black women or heterosexual black men above heterosexual black women.
... [M]iddle-class heterosexual black men who wish to be included in the mainstream often
perform their identity in a way that fits the assimilationist ideal of the 'The Good Black
Man' by downplaying both their race and sexuality."); id. at 888-94 (explaining how blacks
may adopt certain forms of reverse covering to avoid destabilizing group identity, which
thereby becomes restabilized along stereotyped lines); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, Against
Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 853, 859-70, 874-88 (2006) (expanding upon Onwuachi-Willig's
observation); cf. Devon W. Carbado, Straight out of the Closet, i5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 76,
78 (2000) ("All of us, through the ways in which we negotiate our identities, play a role in
entrenching a variety of social practices, institutional arrangements, and laws .
(footnote omitted)).
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analytically or inherently) related. 7 For example, David Halperin non-
exhaustively identifies five coexisting elements -effeminacy, active sodomy,
male love, passivity, or inversion,"' and the "category" of homosexuality (that
is, the notion of homosexual identity). These elements come together to form
aspects of gay identity, each being emphasized to different degrees in different
contexts. They do not have an analytic link with each other. Rather, we
discover their relationship only by studying each of their genealogies, their
development through time, and ultimately their incorporation into the
category of homosexuality. 19 Similarly, many in the modern United States
recognize and identify homosexuals as a politico-legal minority group fighting
for civil rights. This Note isolates and genealogizes this particular element of
gay identity. Halperin and Eve Sedgwick suggest that these coexisting identity
categories can be contradictory and context-dependent.2° Activists often
successfully deployed this model of gay identity using incompatible arguments,
attempting to simultaneously emphasize the insular minority status of gays
and their assimilability into the mainstream.
Before gays could debate what group identity should be attributed to
themselves, and engage in creating this identity, they first formed groups,
congregating in American cities at the turn of the twentieth century.2' At this
time, the boundaries between this "deviant" minority and the majority were
drawn by "[a] society hostile to homosexual expression."22 Judeo-Christian
religious traditions and medical models developed by sexologists defined the
"homosexual." Through these paradigms, the elements that Halperin identifies
17. See DAVID M. HALPERIN, How To Do THE HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY 109 (2002) (citing
EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 47 (1990)). See EvE KosOFSKY
SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 45-47 (199o), for a full explanation. This
existence of multiple coexisting, but incoherent, aspects of identity, is not unique to "gay
identity." See, e.g., Leonie Huddy, From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of
Social Identity Theory, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 127, 162-64 (2001) (discussing multiple meanings
held by a single group identity).
18. Halperin notes that the difference between effeminacy and inversion is a "blurred" one and
describes it further. HALPERIN, supra note 17, at 123.
19. See id. at O9-1o.
2o. See id. at 47.
21. JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL
MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, at 11-13 (1983). George Chauncey and William
Eskridge make a similar point and provide fascinating narratives depicting the "[c]ase
histories ... newspaper accounts of the scandalous and the bizarre, and .. .personal
correspondence and diaries" to which D'Emilio refers. D'EMILIO, supra, at 11; see GEORGE
CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE
WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAw, supra note 2, at 57-97.
22. D'EMILIO, supra note 21, at 13.
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became artifacts of a medicalized homosexual "identity."23 This identity helped
police the boundaries between normalized heterosexuality and perverse
homosexuality. While state reaction to the homosexual menace in the first half
of the twentieth century through legislation, police enforcement, and
adjudication was far more intense than that of the medical profession,' its
definitions of homosexuality as impure and psychopathic were drawn from
medicine and religion. Individuals sexually attracted to the same sex often
internalized these early accounts.26
As the ranks of these individuals swelled in post-World War II cities,
service-based organizations began to appear. Rather than engage in political
mobilization and affirmative litigation, as their activist successors would, these
organizations created the first homophile magazines, provided lists and reviews
of homophile novels and poetry, and supplied information for rank-and-file
individuals in case of entrapment and arrest. The earliest of these organizations
generally did not attempt to replace existing accounts of gay identity.27 Rather,
23. Id. at 15-19; see also infra Subsection II.A.4.
24. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 2, at 24.
a. Susan R. Schmeiser, The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy, Sexuality, and the Rise of Medico-
Legal Reasoning, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163 (2oO8) (providing the best recent account); see
also D'EMILIO, supra note 21, at 14 ("Colonial legal codes, drawn either directly from the
Bible or from the theologically influenced English buggery statute of 1533, prescribed death
for sodomy ...."); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 2, at 23 (providing a history of the
medicalization of homosexuality and noting that before World War I, "[m] edical and press
accounts of sexual and gender deviation triggered social responses" and vice squads); id. at
36-37 (describing the new legal definitions of homosexuality, largely drawn from medical
vocabulary). In his discussion of the post-World War II period, Eskridge argues that the
association of homosexuals with clinical psychopaths grounded further legal hysteria. Id. at
57-97; see also Margot Canaday, "Who Is a Homosexual?": The Consolidation of Sexual
Identities in Mid-Twentieth-Century American Immigration Law, 28 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 351, 353
(2003) ("[G]overnment officials . . . anchor[ed] homosexual status in psychiatric
definitions.").
26. See D'EMILIO, supra note 21, at 21; id. at 37 (describing Kinsey's influence on gay individuals
but suggesting that the influence was ultimately counterproductive in broader society); see
also DENNIS ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION 17 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1993)
(1971) (suggesting that homosexuals "allowed themselves to be defined by" society in the
195os and 196os). Dana Rosenfeld conducted numerous interviews with elderly gays who
explain how they internalized the existent homophobic medico-social discourse on
homosexuals. DANA ROSENFELD, THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD: LESBIAN AND GAY ELDERS,
IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 26-33 (2003). As Rosenfeld notes, "because images of gay
men and women that challenged their stigmatized 'nature' were ... nonexistent before the
mid- to late 196os, accredited [that is, non-stigmatized] identities were simply unavailable
before then." Id. at 63.
27. See, e.g., 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALITY 781 (Wayne R. Dynes ed., 199o). The
Mattachine "wanted only collaboration with the professionals-established and recognized
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in their litigation, which consisted of attempts to defend the right to provide
services (rather than to affirmatively change the law), and primarily involved
cases implicating rights of association and speech, gays unsuccessfully
attempted to question the coherence of religious and medical identity
categories in order to disrupt these identities.28 Furthermore, those arguments
made to outsiders were somewhat ingenuous. In their internal operations,
these organizations effectively continued to rely on stigmatizing identity
models to understand their relationship to society. One interviewer notes that
while gay organizations and gay life existed, "gay life ... was ... collectively
... organized around stigma."2" However, as new activists, familiar with the
racial justice struggle, entered the homophile movement, gays began to take a
hand in producing their own identity categories to replace old ones, which
scientists, clinics, research organizations and institutions -the sources of authority in
American Society." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see ONE, June 1954 (issue
devoted to religion); ONE's Annual Midwinter Institute Impressive, THE LADDER, Feb. 1957, at
4 (describing noted psychiatrist Albert Ellis's speech at the Institute and suggesting that the
movement continue to rely on science to work out the basis of homosexuality);
Psychotherapy vs. Public Opinion, THE LADDER, Feb. 1957, at 8-9 (describing the views of a
counselor, Alice LaVere, who challenged the perception of homosexuality as an illness); Leo.
J. Zeff, Religion and Depth Psychology, THE LADDER, Jan. 1958, at i. One contributor noted in
1963 that "[t] oo often THE LADDER is largely a forum for views hostile to Lesbians- with
no rebuttal from persons trained to detect the fallacies involved [such as] psychologists and
psychiatrists." Letter to the Editor, THE LADDER, May 1963, at 25, 25; see also DAVID ALLYN,
MAKE LovE NOT WAR 152 (2000) (noting that early organizers "often accepted
unquestioningly the pronouncements of psychiatric 'experts"'). While Allyn probably
overstates the case, see Martin Meeker, Behind the Mask of Respectability: Reconsidering the
Mattachine Society and Male Homophile Practice, 195os and 196os, 1O J. HIST. SEXUALITY 78, 99
(2001), there was significant weight given to these claims. The question as to why gays
would initially accept definitions that subjugated them is theorized by Michael Hogg and
Dominic Abrams. They note that self-esteem is not the only reason for group identity to be
accepted: rather, individuals also seek group identity for "self-knowledge," the search for
"meaning," and resultantly "self-efficacy," "power," and control over the self. Michael A.
Hogg & Dominic Abrams, Social Motivation, Self-Esteem and Social Identity, in SOCIAL
IDENTITY THEORY: CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADvANCES 28, 42-45 (Dominic Abrams &
Michael A. Hogg eds., 199o). Michael Hogg and Barbara Mullin make similar points.
Michael A. Hogg & Barbara-A. Mullin, Joining Groups To Reduce Uncertainty: Subjective
Uncertainty Reduction and Group Identification, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION
249 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1999). Rosenfeld's interviews uphold this
theoretical account. See ROSENFELD, supra note 26, at 29 (describing one interviewee who
accepted stigma in exchange for knowing that she was not one of a kind).
28. This is typical for low-status groups. See Huddy, supra note 17, at 135 ("[O]ne option
available to members of low-status groups, especially groups in which membership is
permeable, is to deny one's group membership or identify with an alternative higher status
group.").
29. ROSENFELD, supra note 26, at 63.
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helped them reconceptualize their role in society. They layered a new "legal"
meaning of gay identity upon self-understandings of gays as a group through
analogy with African-Americans as a defined minority group seeking equal
rights under the law."° This identity clearly affected self-perception of gays in
social and other contexts-it is, however, appropriate to refer to it as a legal
identity, insofar as the analogy is dependent upon legal, rights-seeking frames
and contexts for its power and origins. That said, legal minority identity did
not completely replace methods eschewing reliance on identity categories,
which gays continued to use and exploit in various contexts.31
This Note does not attempt to provide an exhaustive description of
historical developments in the LGBT movement during this period. This
account does not exhaust all of the new "accredited," nonstigmatized, identity
categories gay individuals began creating during this period,32 but rather, only
that category which developed through argument based on the race analogy.
Second, given this limitation, it is hardly surprising to find that my
protagonists are generally white, privileged, middle-class members of the
movement, who had the greatest access to the social and legal resources which
helped lay the ground for this new identity through litigation and media
dissemination. Generally speaking, perspectives that may have been held by
marginalized groups within the movement, such as low-income individuals,
racial minorities, and transsexuals, do not figure prominently in originating
this new account of gay identity.
II. DENYING GAY "IDENTITY"
The arguments of early gay activists elided, and often explicitly denied, the
existence of gays as a separate legal minority group both within and without
the courtroom. These activists thus attempted to erode the notion of a gay legal
identity, especially in the First Amendment and due process claims they made.
Section II.A. describes these arguments. As Section II.B. explains, however,
courts and the legal mainstream refused to accept such claims; their continued
conception of gays as a distinct (and reviled) minority group forced gay
advocates to consider different strategies.
30. Cf Huddy, supra note 17, at 139 ("[G]roup identification increases in strength with the
sense that.., group membership is voluntary.").
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See, e.g., ROSENFELD, supra note 26, at 64-67 (describing the affirming identity adopted
through Radicalesbians, a group of radical lesbian feminists, and sexual liberation).
119:316 2009
CREATED IN ITS IMAGE
A. Early Gay Activists and the Denial of Identity
1. A False Start
Communities of people attracted to the same sex congregated in cities
following World War II. A vibrant subculture sprang up in many cities, with
bars and other establishments catering to these individuals. 33 Two individuals
that figure prominently in the history of the gay rights movement began to
treat this new group as a distinct minority fighting for civil rights. These
individuals worked independently of each other, but both were influenced by
events in the racial justice movement, nationally and internationally.
In 1950, Edward Sagarin pseudonymously published his seminal work, The
Homosexual in America,34 which would be widely read by homophile audiences
in the succeeding decade. In this work, he explained that, like those united by
"the color of [their] skin," homosexuals had an "important trait in common
that not only unites them to each other, but differentiates them from the rest of
society." 3' That differentiation made homosexuals a minority group with their
own history, culture, argot, and identity,36 undergoing the same dynamics of
oppression as other groups.37 Accordingly, for the first time in the United
States, the proposition appeared in print that "the parallel [with racial
minorities] is inescapable," for "[t]here is no Negro problem except that
created by whites; no Jewish problem except that created by Gentiles. To
which I add: and no homosexual problem except that created by the
heterosexual society.
38
33. ALLAN BtRUBt, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN
WORLD WAR Two 244-79 (199o); D'EMILIO, supra note 21, at 23-39; ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW,
supra note 2, at 59.
34. DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH (1951).
35. Id. at 5.
36. Barbara Gittings & Kay Lahusen, The Rabble Rousers, in MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS, 1945-1990: AN ORAL HISTORY 104 (Eric Marcus ed.,
1992). Martin Duberman, in one of the few, and arguably the best, discussions of Sagarin's
work, explains that while Harry Hay, the pioneering gay radical, himself often called the
father of the movement, expressed the same notion that homosexuals were a minority,
Sagarin's book was the first to give the "minority" concept wide circulation, becoming the
cornerstone for identity or the "Ur-text" for politics in the gay movement. Martin
Duberman, The "Father" of the Homophile Movement, in LEFT OUT: THE POLITICS OF
EXCLUSION,/ESSAYS/1964-1999, at 59, 68-69, 71 (1999).
37. CoRy, supra note 34, at 10-25 (basing his argument on the idea of stereotype and majority
insecurity).
38. Id. at 228.
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In 1951, Harry Hay organized the Mattachine Society, the first major
"homophile" group in the nation, and for many years, the only group with
national affiliates. Like some of his co-founders, such as Chuck Rowland, Hay
was an ardent communist39 and organized the Mattachine as communist-like
cells with anonymous members.40 His political background provided him with
ready analogies. In 1938, the Comintern had drawn up five principles of what
constituted a minority group, which were based on racial status. As Hay
explained to his biographer, he explicitly invoked the race-sexuality analogy
based on these principles in much of his thinking, writing, and speeches at the
time.4' Hay made other analogies as well, arguing that the "Guilt of
Androgynity [the manner in which he referred to homosexuality] BY
ASSOCIATION, equally with guilt of Communist sympathy by association,
can be employed as a threat against any and every man and woman in our
country... to insure thought control and political regimentation."42
Soon, however, the Mattachine Society was accused of being a communist
organization. 43 In response, fearful of further investigation, the Mattachine
revolted against Hay. They called for a public declaration against communism
and threatened to turn the names of defectors over to the FBI.' They also
39. JAMES T. SEARS, BEHIND THE MASK OF THE MATTACHINE: THE HAL CALL CHRONICLES AND
THE EARLY MOVEMENT FOR HOMOSEXUAL EMANCIPATION 151 (2006) ("The original founders
of the Mattachine were Marxists and . . . were going to marry Marxism and
homosexuality."); STUART TIMMONS, THE TROUBLE WITH HARRY HAY: FOUNDER OF THE
MODERN GAY MOVEMENT 144 (1990); see also SEARS, supra, at 166 (illustrating the founding
members' communist sympathies); TIMMONS, supra, at 177 (same).
40. Interview by Jonathan Katz with Harry Hay (Mar. 31, 1974), in JONATHAN KATZ, GAY
AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 410 (1976). For the best
overview, see D'EMILIO, supra note 21.
41. HARRY HAY, RADICALLY GAY: GAY LIBERATION IN THE WORDS OF ITS FOUNDER 40-43 (Will
Roscoe ed., 1997).
42. TIMMONS, supra note 39, at 136; see also id. at 151 (describing Hay's use of the analogy);
KATZ, supra note 40, at 409 (same).
43. D'EMIIO, supra note 21, at 75-81 (discussing the accusation, published in a Los Angeles
newspaper, and the subsequent witchhunt).
44. Id. at 85; see also SEARS, supra note 39, at 198.
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rejected Hay's and Rowland's comparison of gays to the racial minority group 4s
as unacceptably "making 'niggers' out of them.
''46
After the 1953 shake-up, the Mattachine moved away from the notion that
gays constituted a discrete and subordinated minority group with a common
experience of discrimination, of whose rights courts should be solicitous.
47
Rather, the new spokesmen for the Mattachine sought to disrupt homosexual
identity and group status, portraying homosexuality as a difference too slight
to warrant treating homosexuals as a separate group or attributing a
marginalized identity to them.48 Instead, they sought the right to perform
certain acts, divorced from any notion of homosexual identity. Simultaneously,
the Mattachine moved away from any organized political and legal activism,
preferring instead to focus on services to LGBT individuals, such as counseling,
and on public education efforts.49
2. Eliding Group-Based Arguments: Due Process and First Amendment
Claims
In the 195os and early 196os, those who challenged government action
against gays did so under two main theories. First, those arrested or otherwise
45. Rowland had incited ire among the dissidents at a 1952 meeting, arguing that "[w]e must
disenthrall ourselves of the idea that we differ only in our sexual directions and that all we
want or need in life is to be free to seek the expression of our sexual desires .... [T]he fact
is we are a minority with a minority culture ... and interests." SEARS, supra note 39, at 182
(quoting a 1952 speech of Chuck Rowland to the Mattachine Society).
46. TIMMONS, supra note 39, at 151; cf. Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 45, 47 (1996) (advocating, based on Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a program
of appealing to judges' empathy and rationality, rather than using "thick doctrinal
arguments that alter existing legal categories, extend the upper echelon tiers of review, or
construct gay rights as such").
47. At least, it did so in its legal arguments. See Meeker, supra note 27 (discussing, in contrast to
D'Emilio, the radical activities of the Society in other areas). John Tehranian interestingly
suggests that "[t]he availability of covering (and passing and conversion) strategies makes
organization as a group less likely .... [T]he much wider latitude of covering options
available to both the gay and Middle Eastern populations might explain why both groups
have been relative latecomers to the civil rights movement." John Tehranian, Selective
Racialization: Middle-Eastern American Identity and the Faustian Pact with Whiteness, 40
CONN. L. REV. 1201, 1224 (2008).
48. Statements such as the following were typical: "The Lesbian... [has the] attributes of any
other woman .... Her only difference lies in her choice of a love partner." Editorial, The
Positive Approach, THE LADDER, Nov. 1956, at 8.
49. NElL MILLER, OUT OF THE PAST: GAY AND LESBIAN HISTORY FROM 1869 TO THE PRESENT 337
(1995)-
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targeted as homosexual challenged governmental action for violating
procedural due process requirements, frequently claiming that statutes that
failed to specifically define homosexuality or sodomy were void for vagueness.
Second, bars and publications targeted as homosexual used First Amendment
freedom of speech arguments to vindicate their rights. Activists did not use or
need the rhetoric of minoritization for either argumentative strategy.50 Two
cases in particular received a high level of publicity in the few homophile
publications of the time; neither case focused on gays as a legal minority.
The Mattachine took on the first case in 1952 under Hay's leadership. This
case involved a due process claim: one of the Mattachine's original members,
Dale Jennings, was arrested through police entrapment in a public park for
public solicitation and vagrancy, admitted to being homosexual, pled not
guilty-and won his case."1 It was the first time that a gay individual who was
arrested on these charges became the center of an organized fundraising
campaign and claimed, in what some refer to as the entrapment defense, that
even if he had committed the alleged acts, the policy of entrapment violated
procedural privacy protections. s2
In general, when defending against sodomy prosecutions, activists put their
emphasis on solely procedural claims, both in and out of court. No one argued
that the police action unfairly targeted homosexuals as a group, or pointed to
the general oppression homosexuals faced. 3 Similarly, when gay leaders turned
their attention to sodomy laws in their publications, the privacy rights of all
Americans, rather than minority persecution, formed the theme. s4 Ultimately,
as John D'Emilio explains, the Mattachine itself was worried about becoming
so. William Eskridge similarly notes that the first round of gay rights litigation relied on a
politics of "protection," that is, on arguments that downplayed the minority status of gays.
This approach is in contrast to the later use of a politics of "recognition" as a homophile
minority that they later adopted. Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 2, at 2161-69.
51. D'EMILIO, supra note 21, at 70-71.
5z. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 2, at 87.
53. See The Law: A Discussion of Entrapment, ONE, Apr. 1954, at 7 (providing advice from ONE's
legal counsel on the general entrapment defense).
54. Letter to the Editor, THE LADDER, May 1957, at 20, 20-21 (calling for decriminalization of
acts "privately indulged in by consenting adults and not involving the use of force or
coercion, which do[] not involve a minor child and which do[] not violate any ordinance of
private conduct," and recommending that readers remain "courteously inconspicuous"); Del
Martin, Editorial, Open Letter to Assemblyman John A. O'Connell, THE LADDER, Sept. 1958, at
5 (calling for the revision of sodomy laws). The American Law Institute also revised its laws
in 1955. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
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too visible;"5 after the success of the Jennings trial, gay organizers voted to
avoid litigation that would make them visible as a distinct minority to prevent
"hysteri[a]."s
The second case involved defensive First Amendment challenges brought
in order to preserve the right to provide publication services."s In the mid-
1950s, two homophile publications, ONE and The Ladder, were started and
slowly gained a significant readership. While subscribers had been afraid that
their identities would be revealed since publication began, 8 matters came to a
head when the United States Postal Service seized ONE on obscenity charges.
The ensuing litigation went up to the Supreme Court. The short brief for the
petitioners in ONE was completely lacking in detail that, if provided, would
have brought into relief the "homophile" nature of the magazine. Instead,
petitioners argued that the magazine engaged in "a free[] discussion of human
and social problems" 9 that have "plagued the human race through the
centuries. ''6o Similarly, The Ladder, which catered to a lesbian readership,
argued, "The basic problem herein presented [in ONE] is not whether the




Likewise, in other briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, gays avoided
making group-based claims. Plaintiffs generally pled not guilty to being
homosexual, unlike Jennings, and once more, focused on the procedural
violations of the state in the investigation and of the district court during
trial.62
55. D'EMILio, supra note 21, at 70. The reaction to the case and the increase in membership, see
id. at 75, may well have resulted in a different strategy had Hay been able to stay on.
However, the Mattachine's deposing of Hay ensured a conservative legal strategy.
56. MARTIN DuPuIS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL MOBILIZATION, & THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 17-
18 (2002).
57. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 2, at 93-97; Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 2, at 2161-68.
S8. See The Law of Mailable Material, ONE, Oct. 1954, at 4 (trying to quell fears of the early
readers of the magazine who were worried that ONE was unlawful).
59- Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, ONE, Inc. v. Oleson, 355 U.S. 371 (1957) (No. 290).
60. Id. at 8.
61. Editorial, THE LADDER, June 1957, at S, 5 (emphasis altered).
62. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Robillard v. New York, 385 U.S. 928 (1966) (No. 447)
(raising procedural objections to entrapment); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Poore v.
Mayer, 379 U.S. 928 (1964) (No. 223) (raising arguments based on the Fourth Amendment
search and seizure prohibitions); Brief for Petitioner, Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531
(1963) (No. 133) (raising procedural arguments); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hudson v.
Esperdy, 368 U.S. 918 (1961) (No. 382) (raising the procedural defense that moral turpitude
in New York is an offense, not a crime, and therefore lacks necessary safeguards against
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3. Disrupting Identity: Manual Enterprises and Boutilier
If activists were content to avoid group-based arguments in the early 1950S
cases examined in detail above, in the 196os one can begin to see signs not just
of avoidance, but of group disruption. In Manual Enterprises v. Day and
Boutilier v. INS, the plaintiffs challenged the coherence of the term
"homosexual" and argued that homosexuality was not restricted to a small
minority group at all.6s
The petitioner in Manual Enterprises, soft-core pornographer Herman
Womack, had challenged the Postal Service's seizure of his material once
before in Womack v. United States.6 4 In Womack, both the unfavorable lower
court opinion and the government's opposition to certiorari emphasized the
homosexual nature of the publications that had been confiscated. 6s Womack's
cert petition, however, avoided the "homosexual issue," noting the "female
touch-ups" that were in the publication and focusing on procedural
arguments.66 In discussing the particular images referred to in the government
brief, Womack simply argued that they were not of an undue sexual nature -
since, for example, no two male nudes appeared together in photographs- and
that the audience was simply "art students and teachers." The discussion
eschewed any reference to homosexuals altogether. 6' The Court denied
certiorari.
In Womack, the petitioner had more or less ignored the government's
implicit treatment of homosexuals as a group. The brief for the petitioner in
Manual Enterprises, on the other hand, attacked this argument directly, arguing
that "[t]here is, in truth, no definitely definable and distinct group of human beings
erroneous conviction); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Shields v. Sharp, 366 U.S.
917 (1961) (No. 773) (denying charges and claiming failure to comply with required
procedures such as disclosure of evidence to the accused (citing Greene v. McElroy, 36o U.S.
474 (1959))); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 364 U.S. 824
(196o) (No. 224) (denying homosexuality, but primarily raising procedural arguments).
63. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967); Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
64. Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see Rodger Streitmatter & John C.
Watson, Herman Lynn Womack: Pornographer as First Amendment Pioneer, 28 JOURNALISM
HIST. 56 (2002).
6S. Cf Womack, 294 F.2d at 2o5; Brief of the United States in Opposition at 4, Womack, 365
U.S. 859 (No. 717) ("[W]e don't have to kid each other, we know who is interested in
magazines and pictures of that type... homosexuals.").
66. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Womack, 365 U.S. 859 (No. 717) (arguing that the
government in a "prejudicial maneuver" "twisted" certain "letters ... to throw a homosexual
issue into the case which the petitioner was forced to answer").
67. Id. at 12.
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classifiable as 'homosexuals' set apart from the rest of the population."68 Rather,
citing Alfred Kinsey's work, the petitioner claimed that "'homosexual' is not a
characteristic of a small, isolated, group of people, but is a type of sexual
activity or propensity which directly affects and [o]ccurs in the lives of vast
proportions of our population.
6
1
Furthermore, it was supposedly questionable whether Manual Enterprises
had any relation to homosexual propensity at all. Rather, this magazine was
sold to the "hundreds of thousands of people in the United States interested in
physical development and body building."7" The petitioner would only
"admit" that this bodybuilding group was a "by number ... minority,"" rather
than a minority by identity. Finally, even if some minoritized homosexual
interest could be identified, this interest was "analogous to a so-called
heterosexual male person purchasing a nude pin-up photograph of Marilyn
Monroe."72
Boutilier v. INS,73 in turn, was one among many immigration cases that the
Supreme Court was asked to decide in which various plaintiffs challenged INS
action taken because of their alleged sexual orientation. 74 In 1963, when Clive
Boutilier applied for citizenship, he volunteered that he had been arrested for
sodomy in New York. The INS determined that as a homosexual, he fell under
the definition of "psychopathic personality" and was therefore excludable
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.7 The Board of Immigration
Appeals agreed, noting that "'psychopathic personality is a term of art
[that] includes an alien upon mere proof that he is a homosexual. '', 6 After the
Second Circuit upheld the BIA's determination,77 Boutilier appealed.
The outcome was uncertain. In a previous case, Fleuti v. Rosenberg, the
Ninth Circuit had ruled that the INS could not deny a homosexual petitioner's
68. Brief of Appellant at 16, Manual Enters., 370 U.S. 478 (No. 123) (emphasis added).
69. Id. (citing ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 616-17 (1948)).
70. Id. at 28; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 66, at 8 (referring to Womack's
other bodybuilding magazines).
71. Brief of Appellant, supra note 68, at 29.
72. Id. at 28.
73. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
74. See Canaday, supra note 25.
75- Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4), 66 Star. 163, 182
(repealed 199o).
76. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME
COURT 105 (2001).
77. Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966).
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reentry to the United States after an afternoon visit to Mexico, as the term
"psychopathic personality" was unconstitutionally vague.78 The Supreme
Court affirmed on the different ground that a return from a short visit to
Mexico could not be deemed an "entry" for the purpose of the statute.
7 9
Relying on Fleuti, the lawyers in Boutilier made several different arguments.
First, they again claimed that the term "psychopathic personality" violated
constitutional prohibitions on vague statutes. 8° As in previous immigration-
related cases,1 they questioned whether Boutilier's homosexual acts made him
psychopathic.8 They challenged whether the INS had proven that Boutilier
had performed the acts described. 8' Finally, they also argued that, since the
statute only authorized expulsion based on evidence that would have allowed
the INS to deny him entry in the first place and that Boutilier's sodomy charge
postdated his entry, the INS had therefore invalidly targeted him based on
postentry acts.
84
However, the Ninth Circuit Fleuti decision suggested a new, intriguing line
of argument that would lead to the Boutilier litigants attempting to disrupt the
very notion of homosexuality. The Ninth Circuit, curiously, raised the question
of whether Fleuti's homosexuality was "compulsive [or] a matter of choice.""s
Arguing that it was a matter of choice, the court claimed that Fleuti was
"substantially prejudiced" by the vagueness of the term "psychopathic
personality," since if he knew the term targeted homosexuality, he could have
avoided homosexual acts.86 Thus, the Ninth Circuit destabilized homosexual
identity-in dicta.
Significantly, while the immigration statute at issue never used the word
"homosexual," the petitioner in Boutilier went out of his way to discuss-and
disrupt-the term. "Who is a homosexual?" Boutilier's brief demanded. "If, as
Dr. Kinsey estimated in his Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, at least 37%
of the American male population have had homosexual experiences, are they all
people who would be excludable were they aliens seeking entry here! ... [T]he
statute as thus interpreted . . . could apply to persons engaging in both
78. 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
79. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
8o. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, 1o, Boutilier, 387 U.S. 118 (No. 44o).
81. Canaday, supra note 25, at 369, 373.
82. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8o, at 5-7.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 33-35.
8S. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 656 (9th. Cir. 1962).
86. Id.
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heterosexual and homosexual experiences alike . . . .,8 Ultimately, on this
view, the line between heterosexual and homosexual was simply not tenable.
4. Modern vs. Contemporary Theoretical Perspectives
Modern queer activists who draw from the arguments of Michel Foucault
may well applaud the arguments of these early litigators. Foucault argued that
creating an "identity" around acts allowed a "new specification of individuals"
and acts.88 In brief, Foucault and his successors argue that the acts we now
term homosexual were forbidden in medieval times but without a definition
being applied to them. The individuals who performed them were not socially
branded with any particular identity. After a definition was applied to these
acts, and they were characterized as homosexual, the individuals who
performed them were given a homosexual identity. This enabled mechanisms
of control, discrimination, and hierarchy to form around these acts and
individuals in their daily social existence, creating the boundaries that made
them a marginalized minority. This dynamic, commentators argue, was
apparent in the post-World War II antihomosexual hysteria that swept the
nation. For example, Nan Hunter describes laws that were amended to target a
certain "psychological type" instead of specific acts.8" Thus, the performance of
certain acts created an identity, the possessor of which would be controlled by
the state.
It bears noting that, though they were working before Foucault wrote,
these early activists appeared attuned to these social dynamics. By attempting
to delink homosexual acts from homosexual identity and homosexuals as a
class, the activists potentially struck at the very basis of social control over
those who perform same-sex acts. Yet, ironically, as the historical dynamics I
describe above demonstrate, from a contemporary point of view, activists were
conservative, attempting to dissolve their identity not as a move towards
radicalism, but rather, in an attempt to hide their identity from the law. As we
87. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 80, at 9; see also id. at 6 ("There is no indication by
either the respondent or the [lower] court what is meant by a homosexual; whether it
includes one who engages in both homosexual and heterosexual acts as the petitioner did
... whether it applies to someone who has engaged in it once in his life, once a year, four
times a year, or constantly ....").
88. FOUCAULT, supra note 13, at 42-43. For examples of commentators quoting these pages, see
Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick,
79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1739 (1993); and Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV.
737, 777 (1989). See also Halley, supra note 14, at 14o n.2 ("[Oueer theory is .. .
unimaginable without... The History of Sexuality.").
89. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1698 (1993).
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see, these strategies did not work, because of resistance from courts and
because they did not reflect gay individuals' social reality.
B. Judicial Responses
Courts ignored these activists' attempts to disrupt homosexual identity and
group status, relying on existing models of homosexuality to understand the
issues before them.90
As contemporary government behavior illustrated, homosexual identity
was the basic means used to police sexuality. In the 195os, the entrapment
defense was rarely a successful one.91 In general, the defense only worked if the
defendant could prove that he had no "predisposition" to sodomize, that is, he
was not identified as homosexual, even if he had committed the act.92 Many
courts allowed evidence to be admitted, from incriminating evidence regarding
past homosexual acts93 to exculpatory evidence from psychiatrists and family
members that supported the defendant's claims of heterosexuality.' 4 Other
government bodies, such as the INS, also targeted "gay" as descriptive of a
personality type, rather than of an act, by connecting acts to identity. 9' As
Foucault suggests, the overarching umbrella of identity became the primary
mechanism of control, which could not easily be relinquished. This becomes
apparent in the First Amendment context, where speech and association, rather
go. For more on how these constructions did ultimately control sexuality, see JAY HATHEWAY,
THE GILDED AGE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN AMvERICAN HOMOPHOBIA (2003); LEILA J.
RuPp, A DESIRED PAST: A SHORT HISTORY OF SAME-SEx LOvE IN AMERICA 79-129 (1999);
and sources cited supra note 21.
91. William Eskridge notes that "[t]he Jennings case is the only one [he] ha[s] found where the
defendant won with an entrapment defense...." ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 2, at 88.
92. Id.
93. While not presented as part of an act-identity dynamic, Eskridge provides several such
examples. Id. at 89-92.
94. Id.
95. See Canaday, supra note 25, at 377 ("In the final view of the Court, homosexuals were a type
of people, not a set of free-floating practices from which no conclusions about identity could
be drawn."); Hunter, supra note 89, at 1698 (describing the shift "from a brain disease
model to a developmental personality model" in the military and Congress). Notably,
Justice Douglas's dissent, while quoting Kinsey and appearing to problematize the notion
that homosexuals comprised a distinct group on one hand, also unproblematically referred
to the homosexual as "the product of an arrested development." Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S.
118, 127 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The resulting, very confused, opinion left
commentators with the impression that "he kept finding quotes that he wanted to slap into
his work." MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 76, at 123; see also id. at 123-30 (describing the
many contradictory quotes and views Justice Douglas took in earlier drafts).
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than sodomy charges, were at issue. Homosexual identity sexualized the speech
and association at issue, even where no sex was involved.
For example, in ONE, where the Court sided with the appellants without
an opinion, the magazines were themselves nonsexual - a clerk for Chief Justice
Warren noted that they were "far less offensive than the average 'men's'
magazine... [and were] no more descriptive of sexual practices than dozens of
magazines" like "[Women's] Home Journal." 6 Accordingly, it would appear,
there was no homoeroticism to brand the magazines as homosexual.
However, behind a discussion of homosexuals was the specter of the sexual
act. Thus, Justice Douglas's law clerk queried whether homosexual matters
were similarly situated to heterosexual issues, because of the criminalization of
sodomy97 and because homosexual "practices differ from those of the 'normal'
person.' 8 Homosexuality as an identity, therefore, was inherently sexual
because of the acts with which it was associated. In turn, the identity sexualized
otherwise nonsexual acts. The clerk for Chief Justice Warren admitted that,
"Were the contributions dealing with heterosexual matters, it is doubtful the
community would find them prurient," and considered the possibility that
because of their homosexual nature, "a stricter standard [would be] available
even under Roth."" Accordingly, even in a case without a sexual act or
eroticism at issue, the mechanism of homosexual identity was ever present as a
means to control sexuality.
We see a similar dynamic in activists' engagement with nongovernment
actors. Early gay organizers, for example, suggested that their readers dress and
behave in gender-appropriate ways to minimize their differences from the
mainstream."°' Ultimately, even those who applauded this strategy suggested
that this would make little difference to those who targeted homosexuals. As an
African-American reader of The Ladder, responding to the exhortations to dress
and behave well, noted:
96. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 76, at 43.
97. Id. at 42-44 (discussing a memo from Justice Douglas's law clerk).
98. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). This by itself, though, would be insufficient to make the
magazine "obscene." Id.
99. Id. Similarly, the lower court's opinion identified a "particular group of individuals
constituting a small segment of the population [whose] ... moral standards are far below
those of the general community. Social standards are fixed by and for the great majority and
not by or for a hardened or weakened minority." ONE, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 777 (9th
Cir. 1957).
loo. Readers Respond, THE LADDER, May 1957, at 27.
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As one raised in a cultural experience (I am a Negro) where those
within were and are forever lecturing to their fellows about how to
appear acceptable to the dominant social group, I know something
about the shallowness of such a view as an end in itself. . .Ralphe
Bunche with all his clean fingernails, [and] degrees .. .could still be
insulted, denied a hotel room or meal in many parts of our country."'
She thus acknowledged the majority contention that "one is different." The
trick is to somehow construct and shape this difference, so that it is not
"'wrong' or 'bad' somehow."'0 2 A new group of activists would take on this
challenge.
This Part opened by discussing the medico-religious basis of homosexual
identity. This definition drew a dividing line between a homosexual minority
and a mainstream majority. Activists attempted to deny this identity by
challenging the existence of the division itself- the majority, they claimed, had
been incorrect in defining them into minority status in the first place. Yet gay
individuals often relied on these medico-religious definitions to understand
themselves. Combined with the growing number of bars, publications, and
nascent organizations catering specifically to the homosexual minority, this
reliance would have made these disrupting efforts hard to sell within the gay
community. Courts certainly did not buy the identity-disrupting claims. Thus,
despite the efforts of activists, publications like ONE and The Ladder were
clearly identified as homosexual -to their readers and to courts. Accordingly, if
the boundary dividing gays from straights could not be erased, the only way to
engage with the majority would be to graft on new meanings within existing
boundaries.
III.CREATION: CONSTRUCTING LEGAL IDENTITY THROUGH THE
RACE ANALOGY IN COURTS
By the 196os, the racial justice movement had won several significant
victories in courts and in public opinion. Activists from other minority groups
therefore found analogizing themselves to blacks useful both in legal and
extralegal contexts. An activist who took up the cause for gay rights in the
196os, Franklin Kameny, took the lead in introducing the race-sexuality
io. Id.
1o. Id. She ends with the utopian vision, "I have long since passed that period when I felt
personal discomfort at the sight of an ill-dressed or illiterate Negro .... Someday, I expect
the 'discreet' Lesbian will not turn her head on the streets at the sight of the 'butch' strolling
hand in hand with her friend in their trousers .... [F]or the moment, it still disturbs." Id.
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analogy into gay advocacy, as well as the racial justice movement's legacy of
activism and litigation.
This was a remarkable move. Other minority groups, most famously
women, analogized themselves to blacks during this period.' 3 While the race-
sex analogy led to much debate within the women's and racial justice
movements, 10 4 in the gay rights movement, however, the use of a civil rights
analogy between the situations of gays and blacks heralded an even more
fundamental shift in strategy. The feminist movement had always accepted
that women constituted a legal minority, treated unequally with respect to the
political majority, men."0 ' The race-sex analogy was made precisely to reinforce
this already existing point. As this Part explains, gays instead came to be
perceived as a legal minority seeking civil rights through the use of the race-
sexuality analogy.
When Franklin Kameny was dismissed from his position as a government
astronomer in 1957, he took his case all the way to the Supreme Court. Though
other litigation on sexual orientation issues at the time focused on identity- and
group-disrupting arguments, Kameny relied on the race-sexuality analogy.
Section III.A. closely analyzes Kameny's pro se brief. I suggest that the
analogy-based identity model in the brief helped gays engage with the
majority, based on the shared premise that gays were different, by providing a
distinct, bounded, minority identity and refraining this difference in a
nonthreatening manner. The contexts in which race discrimination and
discrimination based on sexual orientation occurred were often similar, giving
greater resonance to the analogy, as Section III.B. explains.
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Kameny engaged with the gay
rights movement. He emphasized the race-sexuality analogy outside courts,
writing in magazines and giving impetus to the formation of activism- (rather
than service-) oriented organizations. Section III.C. examines these efforts,
showing that the identity that the race analogy elaborated was legitimating and
activism-inducing, and briefly discusses early reactions to it. As Section III.D.
explains, the 1970s saw both social and legal developments which further
established this identity and made the self-perception of gays as a legal
minority group independent of the race analogy in homosexual-and
increasingly, popular-consciousness. As a result, it was no longer necessary to
invoke the analogy to race every time gays were discussed as a legal minority.
103. See Mayeri, supra note 12.
104. See id. at 1052-53.
los. In fact, as Mayeri describes, the race-sex analogy was made as far back as the antebellum
period. See id. at 1052-55.
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While the comparison to blacks would continue to be made for rhetorical
reasons, the analogy was no longer central to this identity, and gays became a
minority group on their own terms.
A. Choosing a Bounded Identity Model
The instability of equal protection doctrine in the 196os prevented
contemporary activists from understanding how exactly they needed to make
their claims. Essentially, they were in a double bind, needing to present
themselves on the one hand as assimilable and nonthreatening, in order to
appear sympathetic and deserving, and on the other as different and
marginalized, in order to gain judicial protection. o6 Frank Kameny's petition
to the Supreme Court, usually considered the first attempt to invoke a "politics
of recognition" for homosexuals in the legal realm,"'7 notes this problem-
"[t]he government [wa]s acting vigorously and properly to secure to the Negro
his civil rights" '' ° - but without articulating the particular formal
characteristics of blacks that made them a deserving minority. Thus, the
petition took blacks themselves as the lodestar: it conceded the existence of
certain, harmless, differences between gays and heterosexuals that were
analogizable to the black experience in similar contexts in order to construct
gay identity, while concealing other differences that would make the identity
appear intimidating. 9
The "Preamble to Arguments" section opened by presenting gays as a
separate minority group, analogizing the number, and level of persecution, of
"homosexuals" to that of the "Negro," "Catholic," and "Jewish minorit[ies]." 1 °
This claim simultaneously accepted the majority claim that homosexuals are a
different group and neutralized this claim using the analogy. After a factual and
1o6. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470 (2004) (discussing the lack of
formal doctrinal criteria to identify appropriate minority groups).
107. Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 2, at 2169.
lo8. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 47, Kameny v. Brucker, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (No. O-676).
log. The debate about whether it was desirable for blacks themselves to proclaim a separate black
identity -nationally and internationally -was ongoing even as these developments took
place. For example, criticizing the "Negritude" movement, an attempt by members of the
Pan-African Congress to develop a distinct black identity, Wole Soyinka wrote, "A tiger
does not proclaim its tigritude, he pounces." JAN-EINZ JAHN, A HISTORY OF NEO-AFRIcAN
LITERATURE 265-66 (Oliver Coburn & Ursula Lehrburger trans., 1968).
11o. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1o8, at 14-15.
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procedural discussion,"' the petition turned to the validity of the regulation
itself and defended homosexuality from the point of view of "those choosing
voluntarily to engage in homosexual acts, [for whom] such acts are moral...
good, right, and desirable.' 12 Here, for the first time, Kameny transported the
subjective experience of individuals engaging in sexual activities with those of
the same sex into the legal arena."3
As if to limit this separate and foreign identity, Kameny immediately
retreated from this identity creation in three ways. First, he reverted to the
early activist focus on acts rather than identity, by claiming that the moral
standards used to judge certain acts were too vague to pass constitutional
muster." 4 Second, he began the longest section of the petition by emphasizing
the assimilability of homosexuals, informing the Court that gays to a large
extent look much like heterosexuals. The Kameny petition, like the Manual
Enterprises brief, emphasized the numerosity of homosexuals, and then noted
that the "most dominant characteristic [of homosexuals] is their utter
heterogeneity.""'  Finally, Kameny used the race analogy to clinch this
difference-minimization argument: he noted that "stereotype" often makes a
homosexual, like a "Negro and.. . [a] Jew," appear more different from the
mainstream than they actually are. This causes the prejudiced to inaccurately
attribute to gays stereotypical threatening identity characteristics such as an
"effeminate physique and mannerism.'' 1 6 In reality, he argued, these
differences are spurious: "[t]he average homosexual is as well-adjusted in
personality as the average heterosexual.""' 7 Indeed, in some ways, homosexuals
are a "group" that is much less cohesive as a minority than are racial minorities:
"[in character traits, homosexuals, once again, are not a group .... [They]
have no more in common than have red-heads outside their red-headedness, or
six-footers outside their six-footedness."" 8 Therefore, gay identity is not so
different that gays should be denied the benefits of the "policies, practices,
aims and goals of the nation, as well as ... the most fundamental precepts of
i1. Id. at 19-25.
112. Id. at 26.
113. Such subjective perspectives were rare in self-presentations of gays to outsiders. See
BtRUBt, supra note 33, at 209-10, for some of the earliest such presentations to army
interrogators.
114. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note io8, at 26-30.
115. Id. at 36.
116. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 37.
i18. Id. at 38.
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human and individual freedom and liberty.""' 9 Thus, in the first well-known
exposition of a gay legal identity, deploying the race analogy helped both to
create and limit this identity. This petition provides the best exposition of the
race analogy, but was, as we shall see, only one manifestation of the analogy in
the movement. Ultimately, the invocation of race gave form to homosexuality
as a new gay legal identity for both courts and activists, with important
consequences.
B. Shared Harms-Shared Context
In making the race-sexuality analogy, early activists generally focused on
those issues where the law discriminated against both blacks and homosexuals.
For example, the first problems gay litigants began to address involved
discrimination in employment, procedural due process, and First Amendment
violations. In these areas, they were able to rely on well-established precedents
in race discrimination cases. ' To some extent, activists had no choice: as
noted above, between 195o and 1970 it was unclear from what harms the Equal
Protection Clause could protect minorities, or in what areas it could ensure
equality.'"' Activists could only rely on doctrine from-and form analogies
with-cases arising from the racial justice movement. Yet focusing on those
areas in which gays were discriminated against in similar ways as blacks in
particular also gave additional resonance to the analogy.
Kameny's lawsuit, involving employment discrimination, is one such
example. Similarly, in the area of First Amendment protections, the right of
association was established in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, ' where the
Court held a subpoena of NAACP membership lists to be invalid. It reaffirmed
this right in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,'2 3 which
overturned a lower court decision holding the Miami NAACP in contempt for
refusing to disclose the names of its members to the Johns Committee of
Florida." Activists used these decisions to reassure members of gay rights
119. Id. at 55.
12o. Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 2, at 2161-69.
121. Siegel, supra note io6, at 1484-89.
122. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
123. 372 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1963).
124. Eskridge, Challenging, supra note 2, at 866. The Johns Committee (formally the Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee) was a committee of the Florida Legislature established
in 1956. Like the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations chaired by
Senator McCarthy, the purpose of the Johns Committee was to target communists,
homosexuals, and subversives in state government, public education, and elsewhere. See
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organizations who used pseudonyms within their organizations,12 s as well as
the regular readership of the various homophile magazines, who feared public
disclosure of their names.2 6 Finally, most important for the rank-and-file gay
man or African-American were the procedural due process protections that the
Court began to demand of the police. 2 7 Interestingly, often it was individuals
who belonged to both racial and sexual minorities that were targeted by the
police, as William Eskridge has described. 28
Furthermore, activists and organizations agitating for gay rights were
familiar with the civil rights movement and the harms blacks faced. For
example, the ACLU became involved in LGBT issues after Kameny organized
discussions between the ACLU and gay rights activists. Its reports describing
procedural irregularities specifically discussed the problems of blacks and gays
within the same publication.2 9 Edward Sagarin himself had long been
acquainted, politically and otherwise, with the difficulties of black Americans.
In 1933, the radical National Student League sent him, with two classmates, to
observe the Scottsboro trial in Alabama. 13° Similarly, in 195o, a year before the
publication of The Homosexual in America (under the pseudonym of Donald
Webster Cory), Sagarin co-authored The Negro in American Business, focusing
on issues of discrimination African-Americans faced in employment, the
concept of separate versus integrated economic models, and other areas.
13'
Other key activists such as Randy Wicker and Barbara Gittings had a history in
Michael Gannon, The Reubin O'D. Askew Inst., Crises That Have Faced Florida from
Statehood in 1845 to the Present, in DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY IN FLORIDA AT A TIME OF
CRisis 6, 8-9 (2002).
i2s. Eskridge, Challenging, supra note 2, at 866 n.211.
126. Cf Mayeri, supra note 12, at io67-68, 1070 (discussing employment and jury service as
concrete contexts in which women and blacks were discriminated against).
127. Eskridge, Challenging, supra note 2, at 830-31.
128. See id. at 832-36.
129. See, e.g., ACLU OF GA., POLICE PROCEDURES IN ATLANTA (1966) (on file with author).
13o. Duberman, supra note 36, at 61; see also Stephen 0. Murray, Donald Webster Cory (1913-
1986), in BEFORE STONEWALL: ACTviSTS FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL
CONTEXT 333, 336 (Vern L. Bullough ed., 2002) (discussing Cory's numerous affairs with
African-Americans, which some have concluded made him especially sensitive to their
plight).
131. ROBERT H. KINZER & EDWARD SAGARIN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN BUSINESS: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN SEPARATION AND INTEGRATION (1950); Duberman, supra note 36, at 66; Murray,
supra note 130, at 334. The book shows familiarity with analogizing blacks to other
minorities, among other characteristics that would appear in Cory/Sagarin's book the
following year. See, e.g., KINZER& SAGARIN, supra, at 135-36.
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the racial justice movement. 132 Seeing the similarities of the harms suffered by
both gay and black individuals, it was easy for these individuals to analogize
the claims of both groups.
Finally, some commentators of the period concentrated not on the harms of
the minority, but rather on the "harms" the majority was forced to suffer in the
name of equal protection: enabling African-American rights, for example,
harmed whites' right to associate freely.'33 While the majority could be forced
to forego some privileges in the name of equality, it was unclear how large a
sacrifice the law could demand. Accordingly, activists touched on the fact that
the burdens the majority would have to bear in the name of gay rights were
minor compared to those it bore for racial justice to justify their claims.
Kameny, for example, characterized the social harms caused by the acceptance
of homosexuality as less than those of preventing racism, noting that while the
"force of Federal troops" overwhelmed "the public ... in Little Rock" over the
issue of integration, "[t]here will be no riots in the streets if homosexuals are
no longer fired from the government service; no government buildings will be
blown up[,] ...no need to call out troops[,] ...no mass resignations or
boycotts ....
While the harms gays faced were similar to those of blacks, they were not
identical. Accordingly, the like-race analogy limited gay claims -it would be
unconvincing for gays to claim protections based on their similarity to blacks if
that protection was from a set of harms that blacks did not experience. Thus, as
we shall see in Part IV, the race analogy not only determined the extent to
which gays admitted their difference from the majority, and the way they
portrayed this difference, but also what harms they could claim protection
from.
C. Constructing New Self-Perceptions
The audience for the race-sexuality analogy was not just courts. Ultimately,
the force of the analogy was felt, not through litigation, which was limited by a
lack of activism in the community, but rather in its ability to invoke the activist
legacy of the racial justice movement for new leaders and rank-and-file gays
and lesbians. The verisimilitude of the analogy altered individual gay self-
perceptions from that of religious outcasts and medical case studies to those of
members of a political minority seeking legal rights. Slowly, Mattachine-like
132. See infra Section III.C.
133. See Siegel, supra note io6, at 1484-89.
134. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1o8, at 51.
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service-oriented models of organization gave way to activism-oriented rights-
seeking organizations. The formation of these organizations, in turn, paved the
way for new conceptions of homosexuality in popular consciousness.
After deposing Hay, the new Mattachine eschewed legal action for service
and education, relying on existing models of homosexuality. However, readers
of the contemporary gay magazines were familiar with the activist nature of the
civil rights movement and the status of blacks as a legal minority. Kameny
began contributing to these magazines after the Supreme Court rejected his
challenge, and exploited this familiarity to encourage activism and help re-
formulate gay identity. He began by criticizing other writers' focus on science
and education. Psychiatry was irrelevant as "[gays] ha[d] been defined into
sickness." 3 ' Unlike the gay movement so far, "[t]he Negro is not engrossed in
questions about the origins of his skin color, nor the Jew in questions of the
possibility of his conversion to Christianity.' ' 136 Similarly, we must "start off
with the fact of the homosexual and his homosexuality and his right to remain
as he is," just "as a Negro and as a Jew" have the right to retain these
qualities. 137
This argument led to a fiery response from Florence Conrad, who was
prominent among the older generation of lesbian leaders. Discussing a recent
resolution by the Mattachine Society of Washington (MSW) which stated that
homosexuality was not a disease, she argued that advocates should avoid
"militant and unsupported assertions" in areas in which the public "do[es]
NOT consider the homophile movement as experts. 113" Rather, strategies by
which researchers are brought "into informative personal contact with a
broader cross-section of homosexuals" were desirable to educate both them
and the public. i39 Kameny responded by insisting that this research was
pointless and that explicit positions needed to be taken: he noted that blacks,
for example, had not benefited from medical research on equality between the
races, but had rather done a "superb job of 'selling'!" their equality. 4 ' Similarly,
135. Franklin E. Kameny, Does Research into Homosexuality Matter?, THE LADDER, May 1965, at 14
(emphasis altered).
136. Id. at i8. Thus, ironically, before the Court was persuaded by arguments presented in Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality
opinion), that immutability should be made an issue, Kameny was arguing precisely for the
irrelevance of immutability of the single defining characteristic of a group.
137. Id. at 19.
138. Florence Conrad, Research Is Here To Stay, THE LADDER, July-Aug. 1965, at 15.
139. Id. at 21.
140. Franklin E. Kameny, Emphasis on Research Has Had Its Day, THE LADDER, Oct. 1965, at lo,
12-13 (emphasis added). In full, Kameny's assertion was,
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instead of relying on medical research regarding homosexuality, "a group like
the Washington Mattachine which considers itself a civil liberties organization
in major part ... MUST have a formal position" that homosexuality is not a
disease.
141
Kameny continued by inventing new slogans such as "Gay is Good" in
deliberate counterpoint to "Black is Beautiful. '' 42 By framing gay rights as
similar to racial justice, Kameny tapped into the activism of the civil rights
movement to end an exclusive focus on "education" and "social services" in
favor of legal action.'43
In doing so, he provided a whole new perspective to other activists. As
Barbara Gittings, one of the most well known leaders of the movement, noted:
My thinking didn't change until Frank Kameny came along and he said
plainly and firmly and unequivocally that homosexuality is no kind of
sickness or disease or disorder or malfunction . . . .Whew, that
knocked me for a loop. He said, "The hell with their research, the hell
with their causation theories .... Our problem is we need our rights,
let them do the research if they are so concerned about it. We shouldn't
be helping them with it. We have to go out and get our rights." And it
was a revelation. This was a whole new philosophy."
These activists, such as Gittings, Ernestine Eckstein, and Randy Wicker,
frequently with backgrounds in the racial justice movement, aided Kameny in
The Negro's claim to equality-which incidentally I accept wholeheartedly- is
not nearly as well bolstered by research findings as Miss Conrad implies. This is
not to say that research findings show inequality, just that not nearly as much
research has been done to show equality as most people believe. What has been
done is a superb job of'selling'!
Id. Kameny was specifically responding to others in the movement who objected to his
methods. Kameny here arguably anticipates Sedgwick's movement of the debate from
constructionism/essentialism (that is, the causes of identity) to universalizing/minoritizing
models. SEDGWICK, supra note 17, at 40.
141. Kameny, supra note 140, at ii.
142. KAY TOBIN & RANDY WIcKER, THE GAY CRUSADERS 89 (1972); Eskridge, Channeling, supra
note 2, at 470; see also Claud Anderson & Rue L. Cromwell, "Black Is Beautiful" and the Color
Preferences of Afro-American Youth, 46 J. NEGRO EDUC. 76 (1977) (studying how the "Black is
Beautiful" slogan affected perceptions within the African-American community).
143. Franklin E. Kameny, Speech to the Mattachine Society of Washington 2 (May 1, 1964) (on
file with author).
144. Manuela Soares, The Purloined Ladder: Its Place in Lesbian Histoty, 34 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 27,
38 (1998) (quoting Interview by Manuela Soares with Barbara Gittings, in Phila., Pa.
(1988)).
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the task of making gays self-consciously seek to change the law as a minority
movement. 145
Simultaneously, as many writers note, organizations that were activist,
rather than service-oriented, began to take root and replace existing groups.4
6
For example, Kameny created and mobilized the Mattachine Society of
Washington as the first organization to perform litigation on behalf of the
"homosexual community." 147 Along with the ACLU, the MSW would aid in the
fight for gay rights, in a similar context to that of black rights. Similarly,
organizations such as Lambda Legal, which formed soon after"48 and whose
145. See ROXANNA THAYER SWEET, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION IN HOMOPHILE
ORGANIZATIONS 63 (1975) ("[L]eaders and members of the [homophile] organizations
belong to a wide variety of other organizations dedicated to ... the advancement of some
oppressed minority .... " (citations and quotations omitted)); id. at 121-22 (noting how
organizations founded to prevent police abuse of gays most often helped racial minorities);
see also D'EMILIO, supra note 21, at 172 (noting the civil rights connections of early gay rights
mobilizers). Eckstein, in fact, had worked at the NAACP. Id.
146. See ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG, FORGING GAY IDENTITIES: ORGANIZING SEXUALITY IN SAN
FRANCISCO, 1950-1994, at 46; id. at 52 (charting the growth of identity-based homophile
organizations in this period); SWEET, supra note 145, at 45 ("[O]Ider organizations, which
pioneered in the formation of the movement, were forced to change to fit in with the new
ideas, or they ceased to receive the active support ... of homosexuals."). Other methods of
organization and communication were also borrowed from the racial justice movement.
Direct action and confrontational methods, for example, while less directly connected to the
law, also affected gay self-perception as a minority group. See ALTMAN, supra note 26, at 117-
62. Elizabeth Armstrong and Steven Seidman suggest that these direct action, sexual
liberation models sought identity-disrupting paradigms. Elizabeth Armstrong, Crisis
Collective Creativity and the Generation of New Organizational Forms, in 19 RESEARCH IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 361, 369, 372, 383 (Michael Lounsbury & Marc J. Ventresca
eds., 2002); Steven Seidman, Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some
Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET 105, io (Michael Warner ed.,
1993). The accounts of Altman and Sweet, however, suggest that many of the direct action
models relied upon the race analogy and upon identity-affirming paradigms such as Black
Power (this despite the fact that Altman's own project wished to disrupt identity). See
ALTMAN, supra note 26, at 128, 140-41; SWEET, supra note 145, at 64; see also Jeffrey Escoffier,
Sexual Revolution and the Politics of Gay Identity, SOCIALIST REv., July-Oct. 1985, at 119, 145,
149 (pointing to "public identity" as a basis of the liberation movement and to the "internal
conflict[s]" within the movement-between identity affirmation and disruption-that other
authors ignore).
147. CONST. OF THE MATTACHINE SOC'Y OF WASH. (MSW) (1963) (emphasis added) (on file with
author).
148. The Appellate Division denied its application for incorporation in 1972, but the Court of
Appeals reversed in 1973. In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1973), rev'g 337 N.Y.S.2d 588
(App. Div. 1972).
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charter was based on the Puerto Rican Defense Fund,'4 9 understood
themselves as "seek[ing] to function for gay people in the same way the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. has functioned for black
people.' '5 0 In a detailed contemporaneous organizational study, Roxanna
Thayer Sweet similarly pointed to a myriad of other new organizations that
took root at the time, connecting them to the legacy of the racial justice
movement.'"' These organizations also reached audiences beyond legal actors:
they not only litigated, but also created publicity that encouraged debates over
gay rights in legitimacy-enhancing legal terms. Thus, even though no legal
action followed a raid upon a gala held by the Council on Religion and the
Homosexual in 1965 as all charges were dismissed, historians point to the
publicity surrounding the event as significant.' 2
As Elizabeth Clemens notes, "[A]s a group ... adopts a specific model of
organization, it signals its identity both to its own members and to others.
Models of organization are part of the cultural tool kit of any society and serve
expressive or communicative as well as instrumental functions."'5 3 Several
authors have noted that public interest organizations in the early 1970S were
well respected-their activities possessed a perceived legitimacy, both in the
legal profession and beyond.'5 4 Not every group, however, could take
149. JUDITH A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND
GAY CIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 60 (2000).
15o. Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, in Support of
Petition for Certiorari at 2, Enslin v. North Carolina, 425 U.S. 903 (1975) (No. 75-897); see
also Thorn, 301 N.E.2d at 545 (noting that Lambda's petition was "substantially identical to
that of Puerto Rican Defense Fund").
151. Sweet notes that activist gays in San Francisco, for example, had begun to define themselves
as "members of a minority group" analogous to racial groups during this period. SWEET,
supra note 145, at 47.
152. CAIN, supra note 149, at 55-56.
153. Elisabeth S. Clemens, Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women's Groups
and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 189o-1920, 98 AM. J. Soc. 755, 770-71 (1993); see also
Robin Stryker, A Political Approach to Organizations and Institutions, in i9 RESEARCH IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 169, 179-80 (Michael Lounsbury & Marc J. Ventresca eds.,
2002) (describing how activists mobilize institutional models "as a symbolic resource").
154. Robert Rabin points to contemporary law journal discussion of public interest law, which
"heralded . . . 'public interest lawyer[s]' . . . as an encouraging manifestation of social
consciousness among young attorneys as well as a healthy antidote to the ills of the
pluralistic political system." Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public
Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REv. 207, 208 (1976). Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, along with
Ann Southworth, also point to the symbolic message of public interest lawyering, in other
contexts. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Law out of Power: Investing in Human
Rights as an Alternative Political Strategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL
ERA 354 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); Ann Southworth, Conservative
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advantage of this model and the legitimacy it produced: as Clemens notes,
"[c]ultures have rules about who should organize in what way and for what
purposes; consequently, the choice of a conventional model by an
unconventional group may [not] produce . . . efficacy."'55 Using the race
analogy, gay rights activists were able to frequently claim the right to utilize
these organizational forms.' s6 In turn, these organizations engaged in activism,
which to some onlookers both within and outside the gay community
resembled racial justice advocacy and contributed to the changing perception of
homosexuals. s7 These groups helped reinforce gays' affirming self-perceptions
and arguably even had an influence on mainstream perceptions of the gay
movement.
A series of wide ranging interviews that Dana Rosenfeld has carried out
with elderly gay individuals lends support to the connection between the race
analogy and self-accepting models of homosexuality among nonactivists.
Rosenfeld's interviewees explain that before the 196os, homosexuality was
perceived critically, by themselves and others, through the models of religion
and medicine. They date the availability of "accredited" rights-based models of
homosexual identity to the mid- to late 196os, '' ls8 when Kameny first wrote.
The sole exception among her interviewees, Leonard, dates his self-acceptance
based on an individual rights concept of homosexuality to the 195os, which he
connected with his involvement in the racial justice movement."5 9
The fora where the analogy was discussed were therefore frequently
nonlegal. Through the use of the race analogy, however, Kameny and others
sought (and, as we now know, were able) to make gays see themselves as a
Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of "Public Interest Law," 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1252
(2005).
155. Clemens, supra note 153, at 770.
156. This was seen in the legal battle over the approval of Lambda Legal's charter, where the
analogy to the Puerto Rican Defense Fund drew the ire of the Appellate Division of the New
York State Supreme Court. CAIN, supra note 149, at 6o.
157. ARMSTRONG, supra note 146, at 53-54.
158. ROSENFELD, supra note 26, at 63. While Rosenfeld does mention one exception where
another individual developed an "accredited" identity through interaction with the civil
rights movement in the 1950s and analogized himself to the oppressed blacks of his
acquaintance, id. at 68, 70, she notes the irrelevance of this individual perspective for the
collective identity of the group, id. at 72. Sweet, whose work was written in 1968, SWEET,
supra note 145, at i, dates the "'homophile movement"' to 1964-1965, when gays
"increasingly began to define themselves as members of a minority group [comparable to]
other minority groups of ethnic or racial bases," id. at 45.
159. ROSENFELD, supra note 26, at 68, 70.
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group fighting for legal rights in the image of African-Americans, rather than
as individuals trying to understand themselves and educate others through
medical and theological research. Ultimately, this would encourage activism
within the community.
D. Doctrinal Developments and the Stabilization of Identity
Soon, however, activists no longer needed to invoke the race analogy every
time they wished to speak of gays as a legal minority. As doctrine developed,
minority groups more broadly became understood both formally and actually
in general terms, as evincing certain indicia of suspectness such as trait-
immutability, political powerlessness, and histories of discrimination. The
lodestar became these categories, rather than racial identity, though African-
Americans remained the quintessential suspect class. Simultaneously,
extralegal developments in the gay rights movement consolidated its members'
sense of minority status independently of the racial justice movement, as briefs
from this period demonstrate. Also, while blacks and gays were often burdened
in similar ways, there were also points of disanalogy which discouraged a focus
on the analogy. Finally, courts themselves were not receptive to the race-
sexuality analogy, which further discouraged exclusive reliance upon it.
1. Doctrinal Developments: A Formal Minority Group
Serena Mayeri has pointed out that as the women's movement progressed,
it became clear that women's interests were implicated in contexts untouched
by the civil rights movement. Furthermore, as the Court began to limit the
remedies available for race-based discrimination, women's rights activists
began to decrease their dependence on the race analogy.1"' Accordingly,
women's rights activists did not always rely on direct, rhetorical comparisons
of sex discrimination to racial discrimination in court. Rather, in the
foundational sex discrimination case of Reed v. Reed,161 the plaintiffs,
represented by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, described minority status using
"abstract" factors such as trait-immutability, political powerlessness, and
160. Mayeri, supra note 12, at 1076-77 ("[R]acial analogies became hazardous to feminists when
the racial baseline legal remedy did not comport with their conception of appropriate
remedies for sex discrimination in a particular case .... [ACLU Women's Rights Project
(WRP)] briefs [in 1970S cases after Frontiero) relied upon arguments independent of the
race parallel, stressing the Supreme Court's new sex discrimination jurisprudence without
making an explicit bid for the recognition of sex as a suspect classification.").
161. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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histories of discrimination.6 Formally, these characteristics were independent
of the race analogy. In actual fact, however, they were firmly based in a
comparison with race, since their significance lay in their being attributed to
African-Americans. Soon, however, they gained formal significance in
Supreme Court doctrine on their own terms. Groups (including blacks) were
not legally recognized minorities because of their resemblance to another
group; technically, they were minorities because they possessed the relevant
characteristics. 63 This would lay the groundwork for gay activists' reliance on
these categories rather than directly on the analogy.
While women's rights activists proffered formal criteria of suspectness to
the Court in a bid to extend the logic of antidiscrimination to areas untouched
by the racial justice movement (but before the Court had accepted this
argument), those considering gay equality suggested similar criteria in an
academic context and stopped focusing on the race analogy. A Yale Law Journal
note164 and a Journal of Family Law comment 6s on gay marriage, for example,
advocated that the Court use a formal characteristics approach. Like women's
rights advocates, the authors were unsure how the Court would approach an
area of litigation untouched by the racial justice movement. As of 1973, as the
articles note, the Court did not always apply the reasoning of the race cases to
other areas. 66 Furthermore, family rights were not a typical locus for racial
justice litigation.
Thus, while the articles suggested that it would be desirable for the
Supreme Court to apply strict scrutiny to antigay discrimination, they did not
rely on the direct rhetorical comparison between blacks and gays that Kameny
used. Instead, they engaged in a doctrinal construction of what constituted a
suspect class, 16 7 based on the familiar notions of immutability, control over
162. Mayeri, supra note 12, at 1075.
163. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
164. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). Reva Siegel identifies the
authors of the note as S.T. Perkins and A.J. Silverstein. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1323, 140o n.232 (2006).
165. Arthur J. Silverstein, Comment, Constitutional Aspects of the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage
License, 12J. FAM. L. 607 (1972-1973).
166. Note, supra note 164, at 575; Silverstein, supra note 165, at 611-15.
167. This is so even though they were unsure what the criteria would be. The Yale Law Journal
note explains, "The Supreme Court has never explicated its grounds for declaring certain
classifications to be inherently suspect," and instead based its analysis on Justice Marshall's
dissent from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Note, supra note 164, at 575. The brief in an early marriage case appears to agree with the
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classification, history of discrimination, and lack of political power. Even if the
locus of discrimination involved (family rights) was not rhetorically
comparable to the areas in which African-American litigants generally filed
suit, groups possessing the formal characteristics deserved protection. Instead
of relying on the similarity of contexts and loci of discrimination described
above, 68 or a point-by-point comparison to a particular group, the authors
suggested that the comparison be mediated through abstract legal categories.
Later in 1973, the Court formally endorsed this approach.' 69 Since then, other
academic writers have similarly focused on the formal criteria of suspectness,
ignoring or deemphasizing the race analogy.1 ° This emphasis on abstract
criteria rather than analogies aided gay litigants in the bid for an independent
identity, without reliance on the race analogy.
2. A Gay Movement
These developments were significantly aided by social changes. The
uprising at the Stonewall Inn consolidated the gay activism that Kameny had
encouraged and deepened its sense of community; a new generation of activists
came to the fore. As gays became more secure in their group status and their
legal and political activism, the use of the race analogy declined in litigation-
not a single brief related to gay issues filed with the Supreme Court in the early
1970s referred to the analogy.' 71 While it had been politic for gay activists to
Perkins and Silverstein analysis: "the analysis presented here involves a mixing of both due
process and equal protection doctrines. As they are applied ... in this case ... they tend to
merge." Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at 12, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 81o (1972)
(No. 71-1027); see also Silverstein, supra note 164, at 611 ("[T]he Supreme Court has not
been explicit as to its ground for labeling classifications as suspect.").
168. See supra Section III.B.
169. See supra note 163.
17o. The cases in which this has occurred are too numerous to mention here. Articles that fully
explore the argument for sexual orientation as a suspect class include Renee Culverhouse &
Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 205 (1993); Chai R.
Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237
(1996); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for
Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1753 (1996); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1985); and Harris M. Miller
II, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984).
itn. In addition to the brief in Nelson, see Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 167, and the
petitioners' brief in Enslin, see Petition for Writ of Certiotrari, Enslin v. North Carolina, 425
U.S. 903 (1975) (No. 75-897) (standing in contrast to the Lambda amicus, see supra note
150 ),see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 429 U.S.
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develop a narrative of an independent minority status distinct from the
mainstream, they soon understood this status on its own terms without
continued reliance on the race analogy.
Thus, in briefs filed to the Supreme Court in the 1970s, mini-histories of
the discrimination that homosexuals as a group had experienced since time
immemorial became regular. In ACLU litigation, references to the ban on
sodomy in Justinian's Code to establish this history, for example, became
almost perfunctory. 72 Furthermore, activists articulated their relationship with
the heterosexual majority independently, without looking to that between
blacks and whites. In Baker v. Nelson, petitioners advanced "hypotheses" for
earlier forms of discrimination by the majority due to their "fear and
ignorance," not of minorities in general, but of "all sexual matters."'73
Simultaneously, they criticized this majority outlook from the point of view of
"psychiatr[y] and sociolog[y]," which were bringing about a change in the
majority's "attitude."'74 Thus, the appellants implied, since the ignorance of the
majority regarding sexuality and homosexuals had decreased, gays deserved
marriage rights, whatever the situation of other minorities. Thus, gays
acknowledged that the causes of homophobia were different from and
independent of the origins of racism and that the status of gays as a minority
group was therefore not contingent on that of blacks.
3. The Failure ofAnalogies
Race-based analogies had generally failed in courts, discouraging activists
from within and outside the gay rights movement from emphasizing the
analogy. In the context of the race-sex analogy discussed further below, courts
often discounted direct comparison between race and sex, relying more upon
formal categories. Equal protection cases such as United States v. Virginia
demonstrate the refusal to rely on a direct analogy. The majority opinion
1034 (1976) (No. 75-1459); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McConnell v. Anderson, 405 U.S.
1046 (1972) (No. 71-978); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Adams v. Laird, 397 U.S. 1039
(1970) (No. 1258); and Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schlegel v. United States, 397 U.S.
1039 (1970) (No. 1257) [Hereinafter Schlegel Cert Petition].
172. The Nelson and Schlegel briefs in fact use the same language. Jurisdictional Statement, supra
note 167, at 8-9; Schlegel Cert Petition, supra note 171, at 6-7.
173. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 167, at 8 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 8-1o.
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mentions "race" four times in its main text. 17' Twice, it is quoting the same
passage of the lower court's decision.' 76 The remaining times, the Court uses it
to highlight the disanalogy between race and sex claims. 177 The Court in Virginia
instead relied heavily on the formal, doctrinal bases of Reed and Frontiero.
Furthermore, while women's activists may have made what initially
appeared to be a successful bid for the creation of formal categories, to avoid
being limited by the areas that racial justice had touched, it appears that
ultimately they were unsuccessful. In spite of the formal reliance on the
categories in the cases after Reed and Frontiero, which avoid explicit analogical
argument, Mayeri suggests that courts still allow the Equal Protection Clause
to protect women only from harms similar to those blacks faced. Harms to
women lacking a ready racial analogue, such as reproductive control, have been
thus siphoned off into doctrinal areas where the primary focus was not equal
protection or race analogies. 78 Equal protection arguments in those contexts
have arisen only in the context of academic writing' 79 and dissenting
opinions."8°
To conclude, doctrinal developments, the development of a grassroots gay
movement, and court reactions acted as interlocking, and mutually reinforcing,
factors, which helped ultimately to make gay identity independent of the race
analogy. For example, the basic elements of abstract equal protection
doctrine-a focus on trait-immutability, political powerlessness, and histories
of discrimination- reinforced the notion of a stable, separate identity,
175. It is mentioned once more in a footnote to explain that even strict scrutiny is not "fatal in
fact." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 n.6 (1996) (quoting Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995)).
176. Id. at 525 ("[I]t is extremely important that [colleges and universities] deal with faculty,
staff, and students without regard to sex, race, or ethnic origin." (quoting United States v.
Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
177. The disanalogy is based on "inherent differences" which exist between the sexes. Id. at 533
(internal quotation marks omitted).
178. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that pregnancy discrimination is
not the same as sex discrimination); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Mayeri, supra note
12, at 1078 & n.16o (discussing Geduldig).
179. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Siegel, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 63
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
18o. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1002-28 (1984); and Reva
Siegel, Reasoningfom the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of
Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992)).
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independent of a race analogy. ' Similarly, a movement that confidently self-
identified as gay strengthened doctrinal abstraction by decreasing reliance on
concrete analogies in litigation.
However, by suggesting that later litigation provided tools to allow gay
identity to stand separate from race analogies, tools which activists frequently
took advantage of, I do not suggest that the use of analogies ended. Even where
analogies were not explicitly present, they lurked beneath the surface of
activists' arguments: as activists invoked formal criteria of suspectness, the
judges, their opponents, and the activists themselves were aware of the racial
justice movement's role in producing the formal categories. Because of this,
even while applying abstract categories, litigants and courts even today often
ultimately refer to race as an example of these categories.182 Similarly, nonlegal
arguments, lacking the formal boundedness of legal claims, often engage with
the analogical reasoning that underlay these indicia of suspectness."' Yet, even
though proponents and opponents continue to use race analogies, their direct
invocation became increasingly superfluous to the gay self-conception of being
a distinct legal minority.
IV.THE RACE-SEX ANALOGY
Even as the gay rights movement began somewhat to detach itself from the
race-sexuality analogy in the early 197os, it became firmly reliant on the race-
sex analogy. Section V.A. describes the birth of the race-sex analogy in the gay
rights movement. It points to the limited relevance of the race-sexuality
analogy to family rights issues concerning gays in the 195os and 196os which
curtailed activism in that area. However, by comparing interracial and same-
sex relationships, the race-sex analogy soon allowed gays to make claims for
relationship rights, as Section IV.B. explains. Yet activists still had to analogize
their claims to the specificform of relationship rights at stake in the debate over
interracial relationships, namely, marriage. Thus, the race-sex analogy
specifically enabled litigation for gay marriage, rather than other forms of
relationship recognition. Section W.C. explains why the race-sex analogy
remains a potent force, despite judicial resistance.
181. See, for example, the reliance on histories of discrimination, supra note 172, to characterize
gays as a group.
182. Most recently, see, for example, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d 384 (Cal. 20o8); and
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.zd 407 (Conn. 20o8).
183. The Proposition 8 debate indicates this point.
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A. Family Rights: An Area of Disanalogy
The racial justice movement largely failed to engage with issues involving
family rights, thus depriving gay activists of a ready analog in that area. As I
suggest in Subsection III.B., in contexts where the race analogy had limited
relevance it was often rejected and ignored: activists curtailed litigation efforts
in these areas due to the lack of a racial analog. Accordingly, the gay rights
movement focused upon "sexual liberty" and other concerns of generally male
plaintiffs in the public sphere such as employment, and overlooked the
demands of gay women relating to family issues and gender equality. While
sexism contributed to this imbalance,'1 4 another cause for the shortcoming was
the limited legal language made available to the gay rights movement by the
racial justice movement.
Early gay male activists were hostile to the notion of family rights,
suggesting that capitalism, which underlay the institution of heterosexual
marriage, was responsible for antihomosexual sentiment.' This hostility
reflected a broader, antimarriage sentiment among gay men that lasted
through the early 195os.
ONE magazine first touched on the issue of gay marriage in 1953 in an
article by a contributing author.' 6 The author asked, "We have a greater
freedom now (sub rosa as it may be) than do heterosexuals and any change will
be to lose some of it in return for respectability. Are we willing to make the
trade?,',,8 The issue of gender roles was not lost upon him, causing him to ask
what the implications of one of the partners being "kept" or being expected to
reproduce would be.' 8  Even though the article merely considered the question
of marriage, without unequivocally supporting it, the article received an
overwhelmingly negative response from gay readers. One such reader
suggested that it was desirable that "the deviate [homosexual] .. .be able to
evolve institutions which suit his needs. I doubt if marriage will do that. What
is marriage? It is an heterosexual concept buttressed and blessed by the Church
and State." 8, Several other letters and at least one article noted that because of
promiscuity and the lack of procreation in gay relationships, marriage would be
184. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 2, at 827.
185. KATz, supra note 40, at 394.
186. E.B. Saunders, Reformer's Choice: Marriage License orJust License?, ONE, Aug. 1953, at io, 12.
187. Id. at 12.
M88. Id. at 11.
i89. Letter to the Editor, ONE, Oct. 1953, at 11.
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an unsuitable institution for gays.1 9° Marriage, in the only major homophile
publication in 1953, had been rejected.
Later in the decade we find a slow movement towards discussions on
domestic issues in both ONE and The Ladder.19 1 In 1961, discussions were held
at ONE's Midwinter Institute on issues gay couples faced in the limited
contexts of insurance, taxes, and adoption and custody of biological children.192
However, no legal action was contemplated; demands remained limited and
untranslatable into the language of a civil rights movement that had not
incorporated such "domestic" concerns. There were certainly no public calls for
gay marriage.
The lack of the racial analogue on relationship issues was connected to
broader issues within the racial justice movement. The civil rights movement
failed to take into account the needs of black (and white) women within the
movement and their more "domestic" concerns. As Pauli Murray noted, in
spite of black women's broad participation in the civil rights movement, "the
aspirations of the black community have been articulated almost exclusively by
black males. There has been very little public discussion of the problems,
objectives, or concerns of black women." 93 The civil rights movement largely
concerned itself with government oppression in the public sphere. Some
scholars have hypothesized that this was because African-Americans, both male
and female, had often experienced family life as a locus that was free from
government interference and oppression. 94 Others suggest that early access to
the public sphere was denied to black men and women alike. However,
growing exposure of African-American communities to the gendered public
sphere enhanced sexism in the racial justice movement.s That is, as blacks
19o. Letter to the Editor, ONE, Oct. 1953, at 13, 15; Letter to the Editor, ONE, Nov. 1953, at 19;
Letter to the Editor, ONE, Nov. 1953, at 21, 21-22; The 3rd Choice, ONE, Apr. 1954, at 4, 4-6.
191. Del Martin, Me vs. Insurance, THE LADDER, June 1958, at 12; Report on Social Service, ONE,
Feb. 1955, at 17; Helen Sanders, Me vs. Taxes, THE LADDER, May 1958, at 1o.
192. Homosexual Bill of Rights Sizzles and Fizzles, THE LADDER, Mar. 1961, at 8, 11, 18.
193. Pauli Murray, The Liberation of Black Women, in AMERICAN IDENTITIES: AN INTRODUCTORY
TEXTBOOK 187, 188 (Lois P. Rudnick et al. eds., 20o6).
194. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1439-40, 1470-71 0991) (noting that unlike
white women, "[w]omen of color ... often experience the family as the site of solace and
resistance against racial oppression"); see also Mayeri, supra note 12, at 1075 ("Unlike the
employment and jury service contexts, where race and sex discrimination overlapped in
concrete, practical ways, discriminatory estate administration policies and spousal military
benefits had no immediately evident racial counterparts.").
195. See Diane K. Lewis, A Response to Inequality: Black Women, Racism, and Sexism, 3 SIGNS 339,
341-43, 349 (1977); see also Constance M. Carroll, Three's a Crowd: The Dilemma of the Black
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
gained greater access to broader societal public life, the profoundly gendered
character of that public life affected the civil right3 movement. The racial
movement therefore focused only on racial inequality in the public sphere,
dismissing women's rights groups to make claims for rights within the private
sphere on their own.' 96
Moreover, insofar as the racial justice movement did touch on "domestic"
issues by targeting antimiscegenation laws,'197 the analogy was difficult to
make. Antimiscegenation laws prevented blacks from marrying whites.
However, heterosexist marriage laws prevented gays from marrying each other.
This was not a case of prohibited intermingling between the majority and
minority group. Thus, it is hardly surprising to find activists pointing to
domestic issues as the one place where gay rights lacked an analogy. As one
(probably male) writer noted:
But for some problems besetting the homosexual there is no analogy
among other minorities. How does one reply, for example, to the
homosexual who wants to know how he can perpetuate his "marriage"
with another homosexual? There are no text books on homosexual
marriage to which one can go for the answer, and most "authorities",
when confronted with such a question, merely reply that homosexual
relations are illegal and degenerate anyway and the best solution lies in
marrying a charming young girl and rearing a family. 98
Unsurprisingly, those who made the race analogy and emphasized activism
often ignored issues involving family rights. Conversely, those who wrote in
The Ladder and spoke at the Midwinter Institute on the domestic problems
gays faced ignored the race analogy and took a nonlitigation based position.
B. Family Rights as Marriage Rights and the Race-Sex Analogy
Arguments against antimiscegenation laws gained purchase within the gay
rights movement in the early 1970s, but through the race-sex, rather than the
Woman in Higher Education, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 173 (Alice S. Rossi & Ann
Calderwood eds., 1973).
196. Cf Susan Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, in Is MULTICULTURALiSM BAD FOR
WOMEN 7, 21-22 (Susan Okin ed., 1999) (explaining why using the "private sphere" to
enable multiculturalism is problematic for women's equality); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule Of
Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150-74 (1995) (explaining
how legal reform in wife beating was undermined by a privacy dynamic).
197. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
198. See Report on Social Service, supra note 191, at 17.
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race-sexuality, analogy. Until the early 196os, women's rights groups had
refrained from emphasizing the similarities between sex and race
discrimination in the civil rights movement. 99 Prominent activists and
academics rejected the early discussion of the race-sex analogy.2°° When the
issue of sex discrimination was discussed in the mid-196os, a memo that
prominent African-American women's rights activist Pauli Murray had written
discussing the analogy was widely circulated. However, during the Title VII
debates, the discussions on the Senate floor emphasized the disanalogies
between race and sex.2" ' ACLU lawyers in the mid-196os also rejected the
analogy.2"'
However, various circumstances led to a revision of opponents' positions
by 1970.203 For example, in 1970, the ACLU reversed its position on the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA).20 4 In the same year, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's ACLU
amicus brief in Reed v. Reed (and other briefs of amici in the case) were
grounded in the race-sex analogy.0 Simultaneously, in the debate over the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), women's groups reversed their position on
the issue and analogical arguments became common. ,
6
19. Mayeri, supra note 12, at 1054-55, 1072.
200. Id. at lo61-62.
201. Id. at lO64-65.
202. Id. at io66.
203. Id. at 1071.
204. ACLU, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff (Mar. 7, 20o6),
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/24412pub2oo6o3o7.html.
205. Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1970) (No. 70-4); Brief for the National
Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 8, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4) ("[S]ex discrimination takes an even greater
economic toll than racial discrimination."); Brief of the City of New York as Amicus at 16,
Reed, 404 U.S 71 (No. 70-4) ("[T]he net effect of sexual, like racial classifications is the
same."); Joint Brief of Amici Curiae American Veterans Committee and NOW Legal
Defense & Education Fund at 10-12, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4) ("Because sex and race
discrimination are so similarly based and motivated, they deserve similar constitutional
scrutiny and treatment."). For a full discussion, see Mayeri, supra note 12, at 1073.
2o6. See Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the judiciary on S.]. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231, 91st Cong.
74-75 (197o) (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund); Mary Eastwood, The Double Standard
ofjustice: Women's Rights Under the Constitution, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 281, 313 (1971); Rita E.
Hauser, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 1O, 1970), in
Symposia: Edited Proceedings of the Annual Meeting Program of the Section of Individual Rights
and Responsibilities, HUM. RTs., July 1971, at 54, 62 ("I also believe that the proposed
Amendment, if adopted, would void the legal requirement or practice of the states' limiting
marriage, which is a legal right, to partners of different sexes.").
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The newly popular race-sex analogy suddenly allowed the gay rights
movement to gain purchase on the limited intersection between the racial
justice movement and domestic issues. As ERA opponents pointed out, if
Loving v. Virginia2 °7 stood for the proposition that formally equal prohibitions
on racial intermarriage were unconstitutional discrimination, and if the ERA
made it clear that sex discrimination was as impermissible as racial
discrimination (even if formally applied equally to both sexes), then sex
discrimination in the case of marriage was impermissible, and one could not
force an individual to marry someone of the opposite sex.2" 8 Thus, when
Matthew Stark, an ACLU Board Member, asked the Board in 1970 to litigate
what would be the first same-sex marriage case, on behalf of University of
Minnesota Law School student body president Jack Baker, the race-sex analogy
would ultimately undergird the case.2 9
Yet, the "relationship" recognition that activists in the racial justice
movement sought was of a particular kind. As Ariela Dubler notes," ' the
ultimate goal was always to validate interracial marriage, even when the
particular law being challenged prohibited only interracial cohabitation (as in
McLaughlin v. Floridal1). Thus, marriage epitomized the meaning and legacy of
the push for interracial relationship recognition -Loving ultimately became its
symbol, for courts and commentators. For gay litigants, Loving and the race-
sex analogy were the only vehicles that could carry forward formal arguments
for gay relationship recognition. However, they inevitably carried these
arguments towards claims for marriage. It is unclear whether the litigation
context created and channeled activists' preferences and perceptions about
relationships towards marriage or whether it merely provided a means to argue
for existing (though recently created) preferences for marriage rather than less
formal relationships. Either way, while later activists sought incremental
benefits, 12 litigation in the early 1970s was aimed at gay marriage. 13
207. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
208. See supra note 206.
209. Stark was also Board President and later the Executive Director of the Minnesota ACLU.
The National ACLU rejected Stark's proposal, but the MCLU went forward. Telephone
Interview with Matthew Stark (Apr. 21, 2009).
21o. Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the
Road to Marriage, io6 COLUM. L. REv. 1165, 1179-8o (2006).
211. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
212. This incremental litigation, often though not always aimed to attain marriage, was
suggested by later commentators. See Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing
Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1699,
1711 (1997) (detailing similar calls for gradualism, though not always to gain marriage);
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By 1973, cases seeking marriage recognition were filed in Kentucky,
Minnesota, New York, and Washington,214 four law review pieces were
(independently) written,21 and a cert petition was filed with the Supreme
Court." 6 The arguments of these early cases and much of the commentary
were squarely based in the race-sex analogy. As the relationship recognition
movement gained traction in subsequent decades, these cases and arguments
set the stage for later activism around family rights issues. Furthermore, as the
events in California discussed in the Introduction indicate, the race-sex analogy
becomes further reinforced by the race-sexuality analogy on the marriage issue:
marriage rights have become part of the gay rights movement just as Loving
made them part of the racial justice movement. Ultimately, while many today
see the focus on marriage as a serious blow to the movement, 17 it is important
Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1994) (calling for
gradualism in the marriage-seeking process).
213. Stark notes that after all these years, the race analogy issue "melded" in his mind with the
more tangible benefits of marriage in the litigation. Telephone Interview with Matthew
Stark, supra note 209.
214. Jones v. Hallahan, 5O S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1971), was only heard at the trial court level and was
not a consensual same-sex marriage: the plaintiff had been unaware of his partner's sex.
215. In addition to Note, supra note 164; and Silverstein, supra note 165, see also James W.
Harper & George M. Clifton, Heterosexuality; A Prerequisite to Marriage in Texas?, 14 S. TEX.
L. REV. 220 (1972), which primarily addresses the voidability of a mistakenly performed
same-sex marriage and considers the issue of what constitutes marriage from a policy and
law-as-preference-shaping perspective; and Ian McColl Kennedy, Transsexualism and Single
Sex Marriage, 2 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 112 (1973), which discusses gay marriage from a policy
perspective. Other law review articles that followed, such as Catherine M. Cullem, Note,
Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141 (1979); Case
Comment, Homosexual "Marriage": The Definition of Marriage Precludes Permitting Marriage
of Same-Sex Couples. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187, cert. denied, 84 Wn. 2d
ioo8 (1974), lo GONZ. L. REv. 292 (1974); Comment, Homosexuals' Right To Marry: A
Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV, 193 (1979); and Leo Sullivan,
Note, Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275 (1973), rely upon the
criteria for suspect scrutiny that the Court announced in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which
were unavailable to those who filed their lawsuits in 1971 and 1972 and are therefore
irrelevant for a discussion of their strategies.
216. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 167.
217. See Yoshino, Covering, supra note 2, at 848 & n.426. See also Katherine Franke's "fear[s] that
Lawrence and ... gay rights organizing ... have created a path dependency that privileges
privatized and domesticated rights . . . while rendering less viable projects that advance
nonnormative notions of kinship, intimacy, and sexuality." Katherine M. Franke, The
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1399, 1414 (2004). She
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not to lose sight of these early litigation dynamics that helped establish this
focus in the first place.
C. The Continued Reliance on Analogies in Marriage Litigation
Activists today still use the race-sex analogy in marriage litigation, and, like
their 1971 counterparts, generally enjoy limited success in doing so.218 The
reliance in 1971 on the analogy in the face of judicial unresponsiveness is
perhaps understandable. The lack of an independent ERA219 or sex
discrimination jurisprudence at the time meant that the reach of sex
discrimination constitutional law tracked that of race discrimination law.
Accordingly, both women's rights activists and litigants who argued for same-
sex marriage based on a sex discrimination argument were committed to the
race-sex analogy.
Since then, however, legal doctrine has established the unconstitutionality
of sex discrimination on its own terms, independent of the analogy. Given this
fact, the sex discrimination inherent in prohibitions on gay marriage should be
unconstitutional in its own right. Thus, the grounds for this dependence and
the grounds of judicial rejection of the analogy invite further exploration.
Modern reliance on the Loving analogy is based primarily on two factors. First,
gay plaintiffs use Loving to emphasize that they are denied the benefit that was
granted in Loving, namely marriage. Second, the analogy is the only effective
way to rebut the equal application argument."'
According to this argument, laws prohibiting interracial marriage applied
equally to whites and blacks, and therefore did not violate equal protection
principles. The Supreme Court famously rejected this argument in Loving,
establishing the case as a fundamental piece of racial justice jurisprudence.
Other areas of equal protection doctrine involving race have been formalized
suggests that "Lawrence offers us no tools to investigate 'kinds of intimacy [and sex] that
bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to property, or
to the nation."' Id. at 1416 (alteration in original) (quoting Lauren Berlant & Michael
Warner, Sex in Public, 24 CRITICAL INQUIRY 547, 558 (1998)).
218. Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in
Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461, 473 (2007) (describing
efforts in Hawaii, Massachusetts, and California).
219. In Singer, a state ERA had actually been passed. Commentators who opposed the
Washington state ERA did raise the specter of gay marriage, a fact that the plaintiffs raised
in their case as evidence of legislative intent favorable to gay marriage. The Washington
Supreme Court rejected their argument. Singer, 522 P.2d at 119o-91 & n.5.
220. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 28
(N.Y. 2006); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1187.
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into, for example, criteria of suspectness; yet in Loving, the Court did not
formalize its rejection of the equal application argument as an abstract principle
such as "arguments that the equal application of a rule within each class
upholds equal protection will always be rejected."
Gay activists must therefore depend on the circumstances and specific
example of Loving itself, rather than on formal rules or categories, to make their
claims. Yet judges have consistently refused to accept this parallel: they have
found against gay marriage claims based on what they take to be differences
between the dynamics of race and sex and disanalogies between Loving and gay
marriage cases.221 Their rejection of the analogy and the equal application
argument can be traced to two main issues.
1. Stereotyping vs. Subordination vs. Classification
By the 1970s, opponents of affirmative action had begun to argue that the
Constitution prohibited both classification and subordination on the basis of
race. However, several commentators have suggested the primary thrust of the
race discrimination opinions in the 195os and 196os such as Loving was that the
subordination of one race to the other violated equal protection principles. "
Others have argued that in the sex discrimination context, the antisex-
stereotyping principles form the analog to antisubordination principles from
221. Readers will note that I do not discuss two recent cases in which gay activists gained
heightened equal protection scrutiny, namely In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008),
and Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008), as these cases rely
on the "legal categorical abstractions" of doctrine referred to earlier, rather than upon the
race analogy per se. I also do not detail recent marriage cases that do not add to the
argument of this Note; for them, see Widiss et al., supra note 218, at 461.
222. Siegel, supra note io6, at 1513-32 (describing the contemporary "[c]onstructing [of] an
[a]nticlassification [p]rinciple"); see also, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REv. 951, 1009 (2002) ("Current Supreme Court doctrine
understands equal protection as an antidiscrimination principle rather than an
antisubordination principle . . . ."); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-
Blind,"44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991) ("The modem Court has moved away from... notions
of race that recognize the diverging historical experiences of Black and white Americans ....
In place of these concepts, the Court relies increasingly on the formal-race concept of race, a
vision of race as unconnected to the historical reality of Black oppression."). But
subliminally, antisubordination concerns may still lie at the heart of the issue. See Siegel,
supra note io6, at 1538-44.
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the race context: rules that stereotype, rather than simply classify, are
particularly problematic.223
Therefore, Deborah Widiss and her co-authors have recently argued that to
rely on Loving, whose opinion was based on antisubordination concerns,
activists must emphasize anti-stereotype arguments. Today's legal arguments
in favor of gay marriage implicitly include both anticlassification and
antistereotying arguments. Anticlassification arguments were present in the
original Nelson brief, which claimed that "restrictive marriage statutes facially
discriminate on the basis of sex" by classifying individuals seeking to marry
based on their sex.2 24 The sex stereotyping argument explains that "the
rationales offered as justifications for the sex-based classifications in these
statutes [prohibiting homosexual marriage] rely upon sex stereotypes" such as
heteronormative parental roles and modeling of appropriately gendered
behavior.2 Widiss, Rosenblatt, and NeJaime observe that the anticlassification
argument, especially in its reliance on Loving, "draws normative strength from,
and vindicates values associated with, the sex stereotyping argument"; they
suggest coordinating the two arguments in legal briefs, to "strengthen[] the
analogy between the sex discrimination argument in these cases and the race




However, herein lies the problem. Judges do appear to realize that Loving
was based on antisubordination principles. However, they have declined to
equate racial subordination and sex stereotyping. In Hernandez v. Robles, which
declined to extend marriage rights to gay couples in New York, for example,
the court held that the parallel between race discrimination and marriage laws
as sex discrimination was inapt, because women are not subordinated "as a
class."227 Similarly, in Baker v. State, the court suggested that discriminatory
marriage laws simply do not subordinate an identifiable group sufficiently as a
class based on sex. It noted that "[1it is one thing to show that long-repealed
marriage statutes subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is
quite another to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws excluded
same-sex couples because of incorrect and discriminatory assumptions about
223. See Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449-50 (2000);
Widiss et al., supra note 218, at 486-87.
224. Cf. Widiss et al., supra note 218, at 462 (describing the arguments).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 462, 479-84.
227. 855 N.E.2d 1, ii (N.Y. 20o6).
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gender roles or anxiety about gender-role confusion. "2,8 After all, "[p]laintiffs
have not demonstrated that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
definition of marriage was intended to discriminate against women or lesbians
and gay men, as racial segregation was designed to maintain the pernicious
doctrine of white supremacy."2"9 The refusal to equate stereotype with
subordination is the first point ofjudicial pushback.
2. Private/Fundamental Issues vs. Public/Secondary Issues
Second, judges suggest that Loving dealt solely with race discrimination, a
public phenomenon, and did not reach the private sphere of marriage and any
sex discrimination therein.
The litigants, and thus the courts, in the movement to end laws against
miscegenation took traditional forms of marriage for granted. Katherine
Franke has discussed in some detail how Reconstruction-era African-American
communities adopted traditional hetero-patriarchical marriage forms to gain
public social status. 30 The litigants in the movement to end miscegenation
laws a century later inherited this orientation towards conventional marriage
forms. As a result, these litigants (and as a result, the courts that heard their
cases) effectively separated and publicized the racial overtones of the marriage
laws they challenged from other, more intimate, established characteristics,
which they did not question. These characteristics of the institution-for
example, the formalization of intimacy, or gender hierarchies-remained
uninterrogated and unexposed. For example, as Ariela Dubler notes, there was
228. 74 4 A.2d 864, 88o n.13 (Vt. 1999).
229. Id. at 887 (arguing that Loving showed subordination of a sort not demonstrated in the
case).
23o. Katherine Franke suggests that the focus on marriage in the African-American rights
movement, accompanied with a rejection of the radically different kinship structures which
resulted from slavery, was strategic:
Many African-American leaders were quite aware that white northerners and
southerners alike used marriage as a barometer of their people's fitness for
freedom, and they urged poor blacks to adopt the domestic patterns common
among elite whites. This, they argued, would help convince the nation that ex-
slaves deserved the rights and privileges of freedom.
Franke, supra note 217, at 1422 (quoting LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE AND
CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION 56 (1997)). Indeed, "it was not
uncommon for 'respectable' members of the community to turn in their erring brothers and
sisters to white legal authorities if they were known to be cohabitating without marrying,
maintaining more than one spouse, or violating the obligations of marital monogamy." Id.
at 1423.
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no question that McLaughlin v. Florida, a case of cohabitation rather than of
marriage, was merely a stepping stone to the brass ring of marriage in Loving-
actors did not even stop to question the value of the cohabiting relationship in
its own right or the value of seeking the right to intermarry as an ultimate
goal.23 '
The antimiscegenation cases, therefore, ironically reinforced divisions
between what was considered private and axiomatic about marriage, and its
more public elements, which are up for debate-for example, race
discrimination in the institution. Thus, contemporaries argued that Loving did
not bring into question fundamental "domestic" tenets of the marital
relationship that implicated issues of sex. "In Loving and Perez," said the
Washington Court of Appeals in Singer, "the parties were barred from entering
into the marriage relationship because of an impermissible racial
classification." '232 The race of the individuals was not a quality intrinsic to the
marital definition, however; nor would that definition be altered by ending
prohibitions on interracial marriage. 33 In "Loving ... [the] [C]ourt[] did not
change the basic definition of marriage as the legal union of one man and one
woman .... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment did not require any change in the
definition of marriage . . .",24
231. See, e.g., Dubler, supra note 21o, at 1169 (discussing the orientation toward Loving and away
from McLaughlin as evidence of "law's generally myopic view of marriage as the only form
of sexual intimacy tied to one's place in the public, constitutional order"); id. at 118o. Tucker
Culbertson argues that Loving was wrongly decided because instead of destroying marriage,
it simply modified it. Tucker Culbertson, Arguments Against Marriage Equality:
Commemorating & Reconstructing Loving v. Virginia, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 575 (2007). He
argues:
[T]he Supreme Court should have condemned Virginia's homoracial
Heterosexual civil marriage laws as an infringement not upon the fundamental
right to marry, but rather upon the Lovings' rights to the ends of marriage- such as
erotic pleasures and communities of care, which for ease I refer to as the rights to
sex and family. Doing so would avoid the nearsighted and naturalizing defense of
marriage as such, which mistakes a governmental means for a constitutional end,
and thus perpetuates and legitimates discrimination against those whose forms of
sex and family remain unrecognized and/or prohibited by civil marriage regimes.
Id. at 577.
232. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1192 n.8. Certainly, marriage between whites and blacks was recognized as interracial
marriage, however illegitimate, for centuries. See Peter W. Bardaglio, "Shamefull Matches":
The Regulation of Interracial Sex and Marriage in the South Before 19oo, in SEX, LOVE, RACE 112,
114 (Martha Hodes ed., 1999) (noting the rare existence of interracial marriages in the
seventeenth century). The question as to whether these were marriages appears never to
have been raised.
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Similarly, courts today treat Loving as a case that, in retrospect, is part of
the broader legacy of racial justice that was being discussed in the public
sphere. As the court in Hernandez explains:
This country fought a civil war to eliminate racism's worst
manifestation, slavery, and passed three constitutional amendments to
eliminate that curse and its vestiges. Loving was part of the civil rights
revolution of the 195o's and 1960's, the triumph of a cause for which
many heroes and many ordinary people had struggled since our nation
began.23
Loving was a piece of a grand historical narrative, taking place on the public
stage of the nation, not within its relationships and homes. Other hierarchies
or forms of discrimination were therefore not brought into question by that
case.
Thus, judges continue to reject the idea that the private stereotypes of sex
and marriage discrimination are analogous to the public classification or
subordination implicit in race discrimination. Sexual hierarchies within the
family, perpetuated through marriage, are ultimately a private matter.
Thus, while race-sexuality analogies are not directly applied to link
discrimination on the basis of race and sexual orientation today, race analogies
continue to affect the gay rights movement. Yet, even as courts ignore and
sidestep the analogy-the reader will note that gay activists have been
unsuccessful in making "like race" claims and were more successful in cases
emphasizing assimilation, discussed in Part II, rather than the
disassimilationist cases in Part III-the disassimilationist notion of gays as a
legal minority with civil rights claims has stabilized and stuck within the gay
community.
235. 855 N.E.2d. 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006). Few other unsympathetic courts explain the differentiation
from Loving. Nelson simply stated that "there is a clear distinction between a marital
restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex."
191 N.W.2d, 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). Similarly, Andersen v. King County relies on the fact that
most other states had rejected the race analogy, 138 P. 3d 963, 977 (Wash. 20o6), and on
Nelson and Baker v. State, id. at 989, for its rejection of the equal protection (as distinguished
from due process) analogy to Loving. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1973), did not
discuss the analogy. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 210 (N.J. 20o6), merely refers us to the
"fact-specific background" of Loving. Other grounds that have been identified include the
lack of intent to discriminate based on sex. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 6Ol-02
(Md. 2007); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Spina,
J., dissenting); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d, 864, 88o n.13 (Vt. 1999); Craig M. Bradley, The
Right Not To Endorse Gay Rights: A Reply to Sunstein, 70 IND. L.J. 29,32-33 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
This "legal" identity, created over time, coexists with other dynamics
within the movement, rather than wholly replacing them. Even in the decades
after the race analogy became "abstracted," courts generally remained
unwilling to reward gays with the heightened scrutiny sought by those putting
forward equal protection arguments.23 6 Activists responded by combining
minority-based arguments with assimilationist due process arguments redolent
of the early phase of the gay rights movement: these arguments claim a denial
of the right to perform certain acts, without claiming minority group status.
This trend continued into the 198os, with litigants in cases such as Bowers v.
Hardwick completely avoiding equal protection claims, relying purely on
privacy-based analysis;237 those same arguments later became the basis for the
victory in Lawrence v. Texas.23
8
The legal audience to such claims slowly became more receptive: during
the consideration of Bowers, one of Justice Marshall's clerks observed in a
memo to the Justice, in striking contrast to Chief Justice Warren's clerk in
ONE,'39 "THIS IS NOT A CASE ABOUT ONLY HOMOSEXUALS ... ALL
SORTS OF PEOPLE DO THIS KIND OF THING." ' A complete discussion
236. Appellate courts have generally denied heightened scrutiny for gays. See, e.g., Equality
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (denying
heightened scrutiny), rev'g 86o F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623
(ioth Cir. 1992) (same), revg 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1545 (D. Kan. 1991); High Tech Gays v.
Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cit. 199o) (same), rev'g 668 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (according
sexual orientation heightened scrutiny), vacated and affd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9 th
Cit. 1989) (en banc).
237. The brief for the respondent in Bowers concentrates completely on the due process
argument, invoking the backing of "society whose constitutional traditions have always
placed the highest value upon the sanctity of the home against governmental intrusion or
control." Brief for the Respondent at 4, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-
140). Of the LGBT impact litigation groups that filed amicus briefs (including Lambda
Legal, GLAD, GLAAD, etc.), only the National Center for Lesbian Rights used the equal
protection argument. Compare Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Respondents by
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al., Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140),
with Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project, Women's Legal Defense Fund, et al.,
Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140).
238. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating sodomy laws nationally).
239. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
240. Memorandum from Daniel C. Richman to Justice Thurgood Marshall on Bowers v.
Hardwick, quoted in Neil A. Lewis, Rare Glimpses ofJudicial Chess and Poker, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 1993, at Ai.
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of this trend is beyond the scope of this Note. 4' Suffice it to say that federal
appellate courts have begun to show greater receptiveness to heightened
scrutiny arguments, not through minoritizing equal protection arguments, but
through due process arguments flowing from Lawrence. 4
The legacy of the analogy, in aiding the creation of a gay identity as
members of an independent minority group, has, however, remained alive and
well. It is thus important to remember, even when criticizing the race-sexuality
analogy analytically, that gay legal identity is historically constructed largely
around black legal identity. Gays began to fight against discrimination in
similar contexts as blacks. Ultimately, developments in the racial justice
movement affected how gays saw the harms they suffered, placing them on the
road to marriage equality. To be sure, the analogy has its limitations, which
have been explored by courts and commentators. However, it may be critical
for the success of the gay rights movement in the immediate future for those
invested in the struggle for gay-and racial-equality to at least understand, if
not approve of, the historic connections of the gay rights and racial justice
movements. This Note has sought to create a better understanding of this
analogy's past to help others analyze how future use of the analogy may affect
the movement.
Second, we should realize that the creation of a gay legal identity was
neither a whim nor an accident, but a deliberate effort to enter into dialogue
with a majority that had already constructed, and engaged gays within, a
certain stereotype of homosexuality. To castigate the creation of a gay
"identity" is perhaps theoretically understandable, but historically problematic.
Gays had to carefully construct a gay identity, limiting it along the lines of the
racial analogy in order to mobilize themselves and engage the majority in the
first place, even if in so doing they limited the harms they were able to address.
Even if gay reliance upon the race analogy in courts declined 43 as gay identity
stabilized on its own terms, and as equal protection doctrine formalized and
became more hostile to racial analogies, its use in legal and public activism
outside the courts has continued.
Third, as racial litigation extended to new areas, gays initially used it to
initiate litigation in domestic rights. However, the only litigation the analogy
would support was marriage litigation, resulting in a focus on marriage rights.
241. For a fuller treatment, see, for example, Eskridge, Some Effects, supra note 2, at 2169-75.
24a. Cook v. Gates, 528 F. 3d 42, 51-58 (ist Cir. 2008) (explaining that equal protection arguments
guarantee only rational basis scrutiny, but due process arguments demand heightened
scrutiny); Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 8o6, 813 ( 9 th Cir. 2008) (same).
243. Indeed, gay use of the equal protection progeny of the race analogy has itself declined in
favor of due process arguments.
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This focus has continued in recent years, along with a reliance on the race
analogy, sometimes with disappointing results. However, the historical context
in which marriage litigation began must be remembered, even as it is criticized.
Finally, this Note began by pointing out tensions between the African-
American and gay communities. Hopefully, this Note's demonstration that gay
reliance on the race analogy has not been simply opportunistic and cynical, but
an undertaking that has created and transformed gay understanding of
themselves as a minority group and of the harms they face, will cause non-gay
critics of the analogy to view it, and the gay rights movement, more favorably.
Similarly, gays must be cautious about seeking to cast blame upon the African
American community for recent events. The Advocate reminds us that "African-
American leaders.., worked hard on our behalf' in the battle over Proposition
8, "even though white gay people have never, en masse and in force, showed
up to support them and their issues."'  However, the inspiration and support
the racial justice movement has provided gays goes further. Like "[t]he work of
our black allies," the racial justice movement itself "created an immense
reservoir of opportunity and possibility for [our] movement going forward.
[This alliance] should not be squandered for the cheap satisfaction of finding a
scapegoat."' 4
Ultimately, group identity plays a major role in a group's relationship with
and utilization of the law. Many groups have internalized social stigma: they
fail to recognize oppression, and, not realizing there is anything to say, keep
silent in the face of injustice. The use of the analogy helped modify gay identity
to make us want to take action, to seek rights, and most importantly, to
recognize our self-worth. Furthermore, for every difference that critics point to,
early activists have demonstrated that there are many similarities between
blacks and gays: we must therefore recognize and remember it as a
manifestation and demonstration of our common humanity. Thus, even if
analogical and identity based arguments channel preferences, limit options,
and must ultimately be discarded, they should also be valued as a means for
initially providing a voice to those that we, as a society, have constructed and
stigmatized into anesthetized silence.
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